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This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four papers, which relate to
environmental policy in the presence of transboundary environmental damage.
Paper [I] concerns public policy in a multi-jurisdiction framework with trans-
boundary environmental damage. Each jurisdiction is assumed large in the
sense that its government is able to in uence the world-market producer price
of the externality-generating good. This gives rise to additional incentives of
relevance for national public policy in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
With the uncoordinated equilibrium as the reference case, the welfare e ects
from coordinated changes in public policy variables are analyzed.
Paper [II] analyses welfare e ects of coordinated changes in environmental
and capital taxation in the presence of transboundary environmental external-
ities and wage bargaining externalities. In the wage bargaining between  rms
and labor unions,  rms use the threat of moving abroad to moderate wage
claims, which means that domestic policy in uences wage formation abroad.
The speci c framework implies welfare e ects of policy coordination that cor-
respond to each of the respective international interaction mentioned above.
In paper [III], national governments face political pressure from environ-
mental and industrial lobby groups, while pollution taxes are determined in an
international negotiation. It is shown that a general increase in the environ-
mental concern and the weight the governments attach to social welfare both
tend to increase the pollution tax. However, allowing for asymmetries between
the countries means that a general increase in the environmental concern has
the potential to reduce the pollution tax.
Paper [IV] studies national environmental policies in an economic federation
characterized by decentralized leadership. The federal government sets emission
targets for each member country, which are implemented by the national gov-
ernments. Although all national governments have commitment power vis-à-vis
the federal government, one of them also has commitment power vis-à-vis the
other member countries. This creates incentives to act strategically toward the
federal government, as well as toward other members.
Keywords: environmental policy, transboundary externalities, lobbying, in-
ternational negotiations, policy coordination, endogenous world-market prices,
optimal taxation, economic federationAcknowledgements
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This thesis comprises four theoretical papers on transboundary environmental
problems and optimal taxation. Paper [I] focuses on optimal taxation and pub-
lic good provision in an economy where each jurisdiction (country) is large in
the sense that its government is able to in uence the world-market producer
price of an externality-generating commodity. Paper [II] studies the welfare
e ects of environmental policy coordination in the presence of wage bargaining
and international  rm mobility. Paper [III] analyses pollution taxes determined
in negotiations between countries, when each national government is subject
to pressure from political interest groups. Finally, paper [IV] addresses trans-
boundary environmental problems and optimal taxation from the perspective
of a member state in an economic federation with decentralized leadership.
In addition to summarizing the four papers, this introductory chapter pro-
vides background to the relevant policy context. This chapter is also meant to
give the reader a basic understanding of the theories used to describe environ-
mental problems and economic policy.
2 Environmental Externalities
In line with the concern for environmental problems in general, and climate
change in particular, it is safe to say that environmental policy is currently of
great interest. Concern for the environment has inspired a substantial amount
of research in economics for a long time. As a point of reference, Pigou analyzed
externality correction as early as 1920. The concept of environmental quality is
multi-dimensional and refers to a variety of issues such as air and water quality,
climate change, the willingness to preservation of wildlife and old growth forests
for future generations, conservation of biodiversity, etc. In an economic context,
the value individuals attach to environmental quality can be measured - at least
in principle - by their willingness to pay for the utility the environment provides.
Based on the value of these services, economic policy - such as taxes, quotas
and emission permits - provides a useful set of tools for handling environmental
challenges.
From an optimal-policy point of view, it is important to distinguish between
local and transboundary environmental damage. As for local environmental
damage, it here a ects residents within a speci ed region or jurisdiction (coun-2 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
try), whereas transboundary environmental damage also a ects the well-being
of residents in other regions or jurisdictions (countries). Because national gov-
ernments can be expected to act in their own self-interest, national policies
typically fail to internalize transboundary environmental damage. The reason
is that the each national government underestimates its social costs of the do-
mestic contribution to the global environmental problem. This suggests that
international environmental policy coordination is generally required to fully
internalize transboundary environmental damage.
The observations above constitute the point of departure for the present
thesis, which aims to explore di erent aspects of economic policy in economies
with transboundary environmental problems. The rest of Section 2 provides a
short introduction to optimal taxation in the presence of environmental dam-
age, whereas Section 3 discusses strategic behavior among large actors, policy
coordination, international bargaining over environmental policy and economic
federations, respectively. Section 3 also summarizes the four papers.
2.1 Optimal Taxation and Environmental Externalities
In the environmental economics literature, the natural environment is often
thought of as a public good. Accordingly, since the utility of such goods ac-
crues to all agents in society, the standard e ciency condition of setting the
private marginal cost of the good equal to the private marginal bene t is not
applicable. Instead, the presence of a public good argues for governments (or
supranational authorities) to provide these goods e ciently. Clean air is subject
to deterioration via air pollution, which is caused by the actions of individual
agents’ - both consumers and producers (e.g., decisions of car travel, produc-
tion technology etc). That is, the choice of consumption and/or production of
pollution-generating goods by individual agents will be of importance for the
air quality (the provision of clean air). However, a pollution-generating agent
typically considers his/her contribution to the environmental deterioration to
be so small that it does not matter for the whole.1 In other words, the indi-
vidual agent takes the total level of pollution (environmental deterioration) in
society as exogenously given when deciding about his/her private actions. This
outcome argues for a use of policy instruments to change the behavior of the
1The economic literature uses the term ‘externality’ when the private actions of one agent
directly a ect the well-being of other agents - without any transactions between the parties.Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 3
pollution-generating agent. By using corrective taxes, it is possible to adjust
the ‘price’ of the externality-generating activity and thereby change the behav-
ior of agents. As mentioned above, Pigou (1920) introduced the idea of taxing
externality-generating activities. This intuitive idea has, thereafter, been used
in a variety of studies and is referred to as a Pigouvian tax.2
The early literature dealing with externality correction typically rests on the
assumption that the externality of interest is the only distortion in the economy.
This gives an intuitive understanding of the market failure arising from the par-
ticular externality, as it keeps the analysis close to the benchmark of perfect
competition. However, from the perspective of real world economies, the as-
sumption of one single distortion is, of course, unrealistic. Due to informational
asymmetries and for political and administrative expediency, lump-sum taxes
are typically not available in real world public policy, meaning that other ‘dis-
tortionary’ taxes must be used for redistribution and revenue collection. That
is, environmental policy is not performed in isolation and needs to be analyzed
simultaneously with other public policies. In the environmental economics lit-
erature, second-best economies typically rest on this idea.3
The early literature dealing with environmental problems to some extent ne-
glects the di culties arising from transboundary externalities. A starting point
is the seminal contribution by Sandmo (1975), who sets out a rather stylized
model showing that the Pigouvian principle holds even though the government
uses distortionary taxes (besides the environmental tax) to satisfy its revenue
constraint. Another in uential contribution is the paper by Bovenberg and
Goulder (1996), who analyze how optimal tax rates on intermediate inputs de-
viate from the Pigouvian principle. Their results show that the optimal tax on
the externality-generating input depends on the marginal cost of public funds,
which re ects how costly it is to raise additional tax revenue when taking into
account the distortionary e ect of increased taxation. Speci cally, it is shown
that the traditional Pigouvian correction becomes optimal only if the marginal
cost of public funds equals unity, which means that public funds are no more
2For a critique of the traditional Pigouvian approach, see e.g. Baumol (1972).
3The basic idea of second-best was introduced in the economics literature by Ramsey
(1927) and developed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). However, Lipsey and Landcaster
(1956-7) formulated the ‘general theory of second-best’, saying that: if there is one Paretian
condition not attainable for the policy maker, the other Paretian conditions are, in general,
not desirable.4 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
costly than private funds at the margin.4 Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) also con-
tribute to this speci c strand of literature by analyzing optimal tax policy in the
presence of both externalities and asymmetric information between the govern-
ment and the private sector.5 It is shown that the presence of two ability-types
(with respect to productivity) implies a social valuation of the environmental
damage not only re ecting individuals’ marginal willingness to pay to avoid the
externality, but also in uences redistribution via the self-selection constraint.
Speci cally, if environmental quality and leisure are complements, environmen-
tal deterioration makes high-ability types’ mimicking of low-ability types less
attractive from the high-ability type’s point of view, which means that the ex-
ternality becomes less harmful if the government wants to deter mimicking of
low-ability types. Moreover, the set of tax policy instruments in Pirttilä and
Tuomala (1997) refers to commodity and income taxes - commonly denoted as
mixed taxation in the literature. In model-economies without environmental
externalities, the mixed taxation problem has been used rather extensively in
the literature; see e.g. the seminal papers by Mirrlees (1976), Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) and Edwards et al. (1994).
2.2 Optimal Taxation and Transboundary Externalities
Thus far, the focus in this section has been on domestically generated pollution
that is within a country’s boarders. However, in the case of e.g. green house
gas emissions, it becomes relevant to study optimal tax policy in the presence of
transboundary pollution. In such cases, the implementation of Pigouvian taxes
becomes a bit more complicated. As indicated above, national governments
most likely underestimate the cost of the externality-generating activity from
a global perspective and, thereby, implement a policy that may be suboptimal
for society as a whole. The problem of transboundary pollution has, however,
been analyzed in the economic literature. To begin with, Barrett (1990, 1994)
addresses issues related to the implementation of international environmental
4Another study in this particular area of research is Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998),
who study welfare e ects from an environmental tax reform in the presence of involuntary
unemployment. The tax reform is designed so that the additional tax revenue from a raise in
environmental taxes is used to reduce distortionary taxes on labor.
5Their paper builds on a framework developed in Boadway and Keen (1993) and Edwards
et al. (1994). However, the idea of asymmetric information, two ability-types and self-selection
was addressed earlier by e.g. Stiglitz (1982).Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 5
agreements (cooperative outcomes). The  rst of these two papers discusses co-
operative solutions in general, while the second paper explores properties of
so-called self-enforcing international environmental agreements.6 Given some
restrictive assumptions, it is shown that, if signatories of the international envi-
ronmental agreement act as Stackelberg leaders, the agreement achieves a high
degree of cooperation when the di erence between a non-cooperative and a co-
operative outcome (in terms of global bene ts) is small. If the di erence is
large, the relatively few signatories abate much more while the non-signatories
abate slightly less in comparison to the non-cooperative equilibrium. However,
since there are so many non-signatories in the case with a large di erence, the
total free-rider e ect becomes large and the agreement has little e ect.
The subsequent literature considering transboundary externalities addresses
a variety of important issues such as labor mobility, international trade and com-
parisons of cooperative and non-cooperative resource allocations. For instance,
Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) study both cooperative and non-cooperative
outcomes in a framework characterized by labor mobility, mixed taxation, two
ability-types and transboundary environmental damage. One should also men-
tion Cremer and Gahvari (2004) who pay explicit attention to the issue of tax
competition when transboundary emissions arise via the production of so-called
‘dirty’ goods. They consider commodity and emission taxes (emissions arise in
production) and  nd that a harmonization of emission taxes above their unco-
ordinated outcome would result in a reduction of aggregate emissions and a rise
in overall welfare. Finally, the problem of transboundary externalities has also
been analyzed within economic federations (see below).
3 The Environmental Policy Context
This section aims to address relevant aspects of the real world environmental
policy context, while also motivating and summarizing each paper in the present
thesis.
6‘Self-enforcing’ is meant to imply that no signatory country has any incentive to leave the
agreement, and no no-signatory country has any incentive to join. Other examples within this
strand of literature are Mäler (1989), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Carraro (2003). See
also Rubio and Ulph (2006) for an extended version of the framework developed in Barrett
(1994).6 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
3.1 Large Actors
By looking at the real world policy context, it is obvious that actors such as
the European Union, the US, Russia and China play important roles. From an
economic-theory point of view, these actors are of particular interest since they
typically represent a signi cant share of world markets, meaning that their ac-
tions are likely to in uence world market prices of externality-generating goods.
As for the existing literature on environmental policy, it typically focuses on
cases where decisions by single countries do not have a signi cant impact on
world-market prices - i.e., small open-economy models. However, considering
the actors mentioned above (considered large actors in what follows) the price-
taking assumption appears less realistic. Instead, these countries should be
modeled as if they are able to a ect world market prices. In such cases, a
so-called emission leakage arises via the domestic environmental policies imple-
mented by national governments.7 The reason is that domestic policies with
the aim of reducing pollution in uence the world market price of externality
generating goods and, thereby, a ect (possibly increase) total pollution. It is,
therefore, relevant to analyze environmental externalities and public policy in
a world-economy comprised of large actors, whose governments recognize - and
incorporate into their policy decisions - their in uence on the world-market
prices of externality-generating goods. To my knowledge, there are no previous
studies dealing with mixed taxation (see the literature mentioned above) in the
context of large open economies and transboundary pollution.
3.2 Policy Coordination
From a global perspective, the best solution to transboundary externalities is to
implement a cooperative equilibrium, in which all externalities are fully inter-
nalized at the global level. However, such equilibrium appears to be unrealistic
from a practical policy point of view. It is more likely that countries agree
upon smaller projects that improve the resource allocation in comparison to the
7The leakage mechanism may arise in a variety of setups. For example, Gurtzgen and
Rauscher (2000) introduce a model with an endogenous number of  rms that are a ected by
domestic policies. The domestic environmental policy a ects the number of  rms, which, in
the end, has an e ect on the consumer prices and on foreign emissions - a leakage via market-
structure e ects. Similarly, Conconi (2003) introduces a model with international trade, large
countries and interest-groups, where emission leakage arises via a terms of trade e ect.Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 7
non-cooperative alternative. It is important to note that, although it has no
domestic welfare e ect, a marginal change in a domestic policy instrument in u-
ences welfare abroad via the transboundary externality. Because such a policy
may be welfare improving from a global perspective, there might be reasons for
national policy coordination.
Paper [I]: Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary Exter-
nalities: A Model with Large Jurisdictions
Paper [I] is based on a two-country model, where asymmetric information be-
tween the government and the private sector characterize each country. The in-
formation asymmetry is modeled in a self-selection framework with two ability-
types, where the decision-maker observes income but not ability. Each national
government faces a mixed tax problem where, in addition to public good provi-
sion, nonlinear income taxes as well as linear production and commodity taxes
are implemented. Furthermore, the national governments behave as Nash com-
petitors toward one another. It is assumed that one of the consumption goods
gives rise to transboundary environmental damage and that the countries are
‘large’ in the sense that each national government recognizes - and incorporates
into its policy decisions - how its policy decisions in uence the world-market
producer price of the externality-generating good. Given this framework, the
countries interact via international trade and the environmental damage they
impose on each other.
By comparison with small open (price-taking) economies, the assumption of
endogenous world-market prices creates additional incentives of relevance for na-
tional public policy. It is shown that the endogenous world-market price creates
additional incentives when determining income taxation, commodity taxation
and public good provision. For instance, the marginal value that the government
attaches to reduced environmental damage constitutes mechanisms that refer
to the endogenous world market price; the world market price in uences the
self-selection constraint as well as the value of net exports. The welfare e ect of
international policy coordination - where the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
constitutes the reference case - is studied in a case where the utility is weakly
separable in the public good and in the environmental damage, and where the
domestic welfare is increasing in the producer price of the dirty good.8 The
8The domestic welfare a ect of an increase in the producer price is made up of a self-
selection e ect, a terms of trade e ect and a demand e ect on the dirty good.8 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
results suggest that a coordinated increase in the production tax accompanied
by a budget-balancing change in public production leads to increased welfare
- holding hours of work, disposable income and the commodity tax constant.
This result is driven by the endogenous world-market producer price, which is
increasing in the production tax and the reallocation of resources to public pro-
duction. Speci cally, if the additional tax revenues are used to increase public
production - while the hours of work and disposable income is held constant -
the world-market producer price increases via the reduced supply of the dirty
good.
By focusing on a special case of the model where, in addition to the as-
sumptions made above, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is symmetric and
the self-selection constraint does not bind, the analysis of policy coordination
is taken a step further. It is shown, among other things, that: (i) it can be
welfare improving to increase the production tax, and/or the commodity tax,
while spending the additional tax revenues on public good production, and (ii)
it can be welfare improving to increase the average income tax, while spending
the additional tax revenues on public good production. Each such policy reform
would reduce environmental damage via the world-market producer price.
3.3 Wage Bargaining and Transboundary Externalities
Transboundary externalities may also arise from activities other than those as-
sociated with the environment, such as wage bargaining between  rms and trade
unions in open economies where  rms can move production abroad. In this case,
it is reasonable to assume that  rms use the threat of moving production abroad
to moderate wage claims. This, in turn, means that policies a ecting pro ts
also a ect the credibility of the threat. The basic intuition is that a larger po-
tential ‘outside’ pro t contributes to lower wage rates, since the  rm’s rent in
the bargaining most likely increases with the threat. Policies undertaken by any
national government, therefore, may give rise to transboundary externalities via
the above-described wage bargaining mechanism. As a national government is
unlikely to consider its own in uence on the outcome of wage bargaining abroad,
the uncoordinated equilibrium is ine cient from a global perspective. Aronsson
and Sjögren (2004) address this wage bargaining externality in a setup without
environmental externalities. They study welfare e ects arising from policy coor-
dination with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, unemploymentEnvironmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 9
bene ts and a public good. The results suggest that a coordinated decrease in
the hours of work and a coordinated reduction of unemployment bene ts tend
to increase welfare. The increase in welfare is possible because even though the
fall-back outcome is a ected by domestic polices, the fall-back pro ts facing
domestic  rms are treated as exogenous by the national governments.
Given the arguments above, where  rms have the ability to move production
abroad, it appears reasonable to assume that some inputs in production (e.g.
capital) are internationally mobile. However, international mobility may give
rise to international tax competition and, therefore, ine ciently low tax rates
and ine ciently low public spending in a non-cooperative equilibrium.9 On the
other hand, Koskela and Schöb (2002) study optimal labor and capital income
taxation in the presence of unemployment and  nd that mobile capital should be
taxed at a higher rate than immobile labor. The intuition behind this result is
that, in a situation with unemployment, labor supply becomes locally in nitely
elastic.10 However, since none of the earlier studies have incorporated the wage
bargaining externality explained above to a framework with (transboundary)
environmental damage, paper [II] mainly contributes to the literature by study-
ing the welfare e ect from coordinated changes in environmental and capital
taxes in such a context.
Paper [II]: Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental Policy Co-
ordination?
Paper [II] studies public policy in a multi-country framework characterized by a
transboundary environmental externality and a labor market imperfection aris-
ing via wage bargaining between a labor union and a  rm. Within each country,
competitive  rms produce a single output using labor, capital and energy. The
use of energy is assumed to create a negative transboundary environmental
externality. Paper [II] analyses welfare e ects of coordinated changes in envi-
ronmental and capital taxation, where the pre-reform resource allocation is a
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. From a global perspective, the uncoordi-
nated equilibrium is ine cient both because of the transboundary environmen-
tal externality and because of the wage bargaining externality explained above.
Speci cally, national governments do not take into account that their behav-
9See e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1989).
10A study dealing with policy coordination in the presence of unemployment is Fuest and
Huber (1999).10 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
ior potentially gives rise to transboundary environmental damage and that the
pro t earned by domestic  rms constitutes the fall-back pro t in other countries.
The welfare e ect of a coordinated increase in the emission and capital tax
becomes indeterminate in the general framework. However, it is shown that
the welfare e ect of each reform is made up of two parts, each corresponding
to the respective externality discussed above. By assuming quasi-linear utility
functions and a Cobb-Douglas production technology, it is, however, possible
to derive conditions under which the welfare e ects are possible to sign. As
for a coordinated increase in the emission tax, it improves welfare if the ratio
of the net tax revenue11 and the wage is smaller than the output elasticity of
labor. This result can be interpreted as a ‘double-dividend’ because both the
environmental externality and the wage bargaining externality are reduced. If,
on the other hand, the ratio of the net tax revenue and the wage is larger than
the output elasticity of labor, the welfare e ect is ambiguous. The reason is
that a coordinated increase in the emission tax may reinforce the international
wage bargaining externality. The welfare e ect from a coordinated increase in
the capital income tax becomes zero if utility functions are quasi-linear and
production technology is characterized by Cobb-Douglas. However, if these
assumptions are relaxed the total welfare e ect becomes ambiguous.
3.4 International Negotiations and Interest-Groups
In addition to the increasingly important international perspective on environ-
mental policy, national governments also face political pressure from interest
groups (referred to as ‘lobby-groups’ in what follows).12 The reason for lob-
bying is that governmental use of economic policy tools (such as taxes) a ects
individual agents, which create incentives for in uencing the use of these tools.
In the economic literature, lobbying is commonly studied within the menu auc-
tion model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994).13 In the menu auction
model, lobby-groups o er an incumbent government a set of campaign contri-
11The net tax revenue is de ned as the sum of the lump-sum tax per employed worker and
the unemployment bene t.
12Examples of interest groups that are concerned with environmental issues are Greenpeace
and the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (Naturskyddsföreningen).
13The model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) originates from Bernheim and
Whinston (1986). The term ‘menu auction’ refers to a situation where bidders announce a
‘menu’ of o ers - associated with speci c actions - to an ‘auctioneer’.Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 11
butions in return for particular policies. The incumbent government recognizes
that the probability of re-election depends on the amount spent on campaigning
and voters’ utility derived from current governmental policies.
The literature dealing with the combination of lobbying and environmental
policy has mainly focused on policies decided upon at the national level. For
instance, Fredriksson (1997) supports, to some extent, the expected intuition
that ‘green lobbying’ leads to a stricter environmental policy at the national
level when pollution remains within country boarders. However, Aidt (2005)
shows that an increase in environmentalism may lead to lower pollution taxes
and increased worldwide pollution. This particular result, however, rests on the
assumption that pollution is immobile and environmentalists care su ciently
about pollution that arises abroad. The intuition is that if environmentalists
are very concerned with pollution abroad, the lobby group is willing to accept
more pollution at home in return for less pollution abroad, which means a lower
domestic tax on pollution.
There are few studies dealing with transboundary externalities in combina-
tion with lobbying. One is Conconi (2003) who extends the lobby-group liter-
ature by introducing both international trade and transboundary pollution. In
her paper, it is shown that such interactions between countries imply, among
other things, that one country’s increase in pollution taxes, triggered by lobby-
ing, improves the terms of trade for the other country, which, in turn, leads to
increased production and emissions. Although the environmental lobby-group
literature - including Conconi (2003) - addresses a variety of interesting aspects,
it has so far neglected international environmental policy. Paper [III], therefore,
contributes to the literature by studying the combination of (i) lobbying at the
national level and (ii) international environmental policy determined in negoti-
ations between countries. Within such a context, paper [III] sheds some light
on how environmental policies are a ected by changes in lobbying activities as
well as in government objectives.14
Paper [III]: Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary Pol-
lution and Lobby Groups in Small Open Economies
In paper [III], national governments face political pressure from environmental
14To isolate the mechanisms arising from the negotiation of environmental policy and the
transboundary pollution, respectively, paper [III] disregards the international trade aspect
addressed by Conconi (2003).12 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
as well as industrial lobby groups. Environmental policies - here de ned as pol-
lution taxes - are determined in a negotiation between the national governments,
and each country is assumed to be small in the sense of treating world market
prices as exogenous. It is also assumed that the countries both generate and are
a ected by transboundary pollution. The political pressure on the national gov-
ernments is modeled so that environmental and industrial lobby groups at the
national level o er the incumbent domestic government a contribution schedule
that depends on the pollution tax. The incumbent governments use these con-
tributions to  nance campaign spending and, thereby, increase the probability
of re-election. The objective of each national government in the bargain with
other countries is to maximize a weighted sum of aggregate campaign contribu-
tions and aggregate social welfare. Given the rents from the bargain between
the national governments — here de ned as the di erence between the ‘contract
outcome’ and the ‘no-contract’ outcome - the outcome will be pollution taxes
that maximize the product of these rents.
It is shown that a general increase in environmental concern - here de ned
as an increase in the number of environmentalists in both countries (the number
of countries is normalized to two) - as well as in the weight the governments
attaches to social welfare, tends to increase the pollution tax in a symmetric
equilibrium. On the other hand, an increase in the number of environmentalists
in just one country may reduce the other country’s pollution tax in a symmetric
equilibrium. The underlying mechanism is that if one country is willing to ‘ac-
cept’ a higher domestic tax on pollution, the other country indirectly uses this to
negotiate a lower tax on its own pollution. Moreover, allowing for asymmetries
between the two countries gives rise to results that are potentially even more in-
teresting. It is shown that a general increase in the environmental concern may
reduce the pollution tax, since the increase in environmental concern tends to
increase as well as decrease the pollution tax. The mechanism that tends to in-
crease the pollution tax is more or less standard, but the mechanism that works
to reduce the pollution tax is, perhaps, more counterintuitive. The intuition for
the latter mechanism is that the government becomes more eager to reach an
agreement when the domestic environmental concern increases, meaning that
the pressure on the other country to implement a strict environmental policy
reduces in the bargain. One conclusion from paper [III] is, therefore, thatEnvironmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities 13
an increase in the environmental concern does not necessarily lead to a stricter
environmental policy for the global economy as a whole.
3.5 Environmental Policy and Economic Federations
As indicated above, the literature on optimal taxation in the presence of trans-
boundary environmental externalities typically focuses on tax and expenditure
policies to implement non-cooperative and cooperative resource allocations, or
welfare e ects of policy coordination, without paying much attention on the
institutional structure within which the public policy is decided upon. In a
European context, however, the European Union (EU) plays an important role
for environmental policy cooperation, suggesting that a  scal-federalism-like
framework may provide insights of relevance for environmental policy. For in-
stance, the supranational (federal) level of the EU determines emission targets
(maximum allowable emissions) for greenhouse gases in each member country,
while each member country is responsible for the implementation of these tar-
gets. Given this observation, it is relevant to study a federal decision structure’s
in uence on the incentives underlying national public policies implemented by
member countries.
The economic literature characterizes economic federations as structures
with several levels of governments, where each level has its own policy instru-
ments and responsibilities. This characterization implies that countries - with
their national and lower level governments - as well as supranational authorities
with several member countries, are considered economic federations. Depending
on which level of government has commitment power, economic federations may
be thought of as either centralized or decentralized. A centralized federation is
interpreted so that each lower level government acts as a follower vis-à-vis the
federal level. That is, the federal government is able to commit to its policies,
whereas the lower level governments are not. It has been argued that EU mem-
ber countries have commitment power vis-à-vis the federal government and,
therefore, act as  rst movers (denoted vertical leadership in what follows).15
Hence, the EU is typically thought of as a decentralized economic federation.
Silva and Caplan (1997), and Caplan and Silva (1999) characterize envi-
ronmental policy outcomes in a federation which - depending on the level that
makes credible commitments - is interpreted as either centralized or decen-
15See e.g. Jones and Clark (2001, p. 2).14 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
tralized. Their results highlight the importance of the distribution of policy
instruments between the levels of government. Given model speci c assump-
tions, it is shown that it is socially desirable to give regional governments the
tax (price) instrument, while giving the central government a quantity instru-
ment. With the EU as a source of inspiration, Aronsson et al. (2006) consider
an economic federation comprising two lower level governments (countries) and
a federal government. The federal government is assumed to decide upon an
emission target for each country, which is to be implemented through national
tax policies. The economic federation is characterized by decentralized leader-
ship, modelled so that the national (lower level) governments are  rst movers
vis-à-vis the federal government, and the environmental targets are, therefore,
conditioned on the national tax policies. Their results show that decentralized
leadership creates incentives for each national government to in uence the emis-
sion targets decided by the federal government. This implies that each country
implements commodity taxes that do not satisfy the additivity property, and
that the marginal labor income tax is, in part, also used to relax the emission
target.16
Returning once again to the EU, it also appears reasonable to view the
member countries as heterogeneous among themselves with respect to horizon-
tal commitment power, meaning that one of the countries may act as  rst mover
vis-à-vis the others. For instance, it is plausible that large countries, such as
Germany and France, can be more committed to national objectives than small
countries such as Luxemburg and Sweden. This follows from the argument that
relatively large countries play an important role for the economic development
within the federation, and the smaller countries, therefore, act as if they are
followers vis-à-vis the large countries. These arguments give a reason to extend
the existing literature on environmental policy in economic federations, which
has so far neglected the issue of horizontal commitment power. Paper [IV],
therefore, deals with optimal taxation and transboundary environmental prob-
lems in a decentralized economic federation, where the member countries di er
with respect to horizontal commitment power.
16Apart from the problem of environmental externalities, there are studies addressing issues
such as pure public good provision, tax competition and redistribution within federations
characterized by decentralized leadership; see e.g. Caplan et al. (2000), Köthenburger (2004)
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Paper [IV]: Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and Hor-
izontal Commitment Power
Given an economic federation where the federal government determines emis-
sion targets for each of the member countries, paper [IV] studies the optimal use
of linear production taxes and non-linear income taxes at the national (member
state) level. Taking Aronsson et al. (2006) as a starting point, the economic
federation is assumed to be decentralized in the sense that each member country
acts as a  rst mover vis-à-vis the federal government - interpreted so that the
federal government chooses emission targets conditional on the national public
policy. In addition, one of the two member countries, the horizontal Stackelberg
leader, also acts as  rst mover vis-à-vis the other member country - the horizon-
tal follower. That is, the horizontal Stackelberg leader chooses its policy while
anticipating, and incorporating into its decision problem, how the horizontal
follower and the federal government respond to its policy.
By primarily focusing on the horizontal Stackelberg leader, the results show
that, in addition to the standard result that environmental taxation should
re ect the marginal willingness to pay for reduced environmental damage, the
heterogeneity with respect to commitment power between member countries
creates additional incentives for in uencing the environmental targets imposed
by the federal government. Speci cally, the horizontal Stackelberg leader uses its
commitment power to loosen its own emission target, while tightening it for the
horizontal follower. These results rest on how the federal government determines
the emission targets implemented by the national governments. In equilibrium,
the emission targets for each country is (in principle) chosen so that the value of
the marginal product of the bad input equals the sum of marginal willingness to
pay for reduced environmental damage, adjusted for di erences in the marginal
utility of income between the countries. For the horizontal Stackelberg leader,
this creates an opportunity to in uence the emission targets directly via the
domestic choice of labor (re ected in the marginal income tax) and indirectly
via its in uence on the horizontal follower’s behavior (re ected both in the
production tax and the marginal income tax). However, it is important to bear
in mind that these speci c results presuppose that all member countries act as
 rst movers vis-à-vis the federal government.16 Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities
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the world-market producer price of the externality-generating commod-
ity. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction
is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between
the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to
in uence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature on transboundary environmental problems, it has been recog-
nized that national environmental policies may fail to fully internalize exter-
nalities, and that policy cooperation among countries (or regions) is generally
required in order to reach a globally optimal resource allocation. There are sev-
eral sources of ine ciency associated with noncooperative policies; for instance,
individual countries are likely to disregard the transboundary component of the
environmental damage they cause, since their policy-decisions are typically gov-
erned by national objectives, and their policies may also give rise to side e ects
via changes in the price system. However, despite the existence of certain supra-
national agreements, there is still substantial room for policies decided upon at
the national level or by subgroups of countries such as the EU, suggesting that
the incentives underlying decentralized policies are important to understand.
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public good provision at the na-
tional level, as well as the welfare e ects of policy coordination, in an economy
where the aggregate consumption of a particular good, to be called ’dirty good’,
generates a transboundary environmental problem. Our study is based on a
framework with mixed taxation, where each national government faces a non-
linear income tax as well as linear commodity and production taxes. This set
of tax instruments provides a reasonably realistic description of the tax system
that many national governments have at their disposal. It also implies that the
use of distortionary taxes is a consequence of optimization under informational
restrictions; it is not a consequence of any (arbitrary) restriction imposed on
the set of tax instruments.
Contrary to earlier literature on environmental policy under mixed taxation
(see below), we assume that the countries are large in the sense that each na-
tional government is able to signi cantly a ect the world-market producer price
of the externality-generating good. Such a framework is interesting to consider
for at least two reasons. First, although many countries are small enough to
make the ’price-taking government’ assumption realistic, the environmental pol-
icy scene is also characterized by large actors such as the U.S. and some other
countries, as well as by subgroups of countries acting together such as the EU,
where the price-taking assumption appears to be less realistic. Our study takes
this observation to its extreme point by analyzing a world-economy comprising2 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
a number of large actors, whose governments recognize (and incorporate into
their decision-problems) that their policies will a ect the world-market producer
prices of externality-generating commodities. Second, our approach integrates
earlier literature on the so called ’leakage’ phenomenon with the theory of mixed
taxation, which makes it possible to compare large and small open economies
with respect to the whole tax structure; not just with respect to environmental
policy.
The literature on  scal policy in second best economies with transboundary
environmental problems is relatively small by comparison with the correspond-
ing literature dealing with  scal policy in second best economies with local
(i.e. within-jurisdiction) environmental damage1. Earlier research in the for-
mer category, nevertheless, addresses a variety of issues such as comparisons
between noncooperative and cooperative regimes with respect to tax policies
2, labor mobility3,  scal competition due to international trade4 and strate-
gic aspects of public policy in the context of economic federations5.H o w e v e r ,
none of the studies that we are aware of combines transboundary environmental
problems and mixed taxation in the context of large open economies. An inter-
esting observation (discussed many times in other contexts) is that there might
be emission-leakage associated with the environmental policy decided upon by
national governments; for instance, if higher emission taxes in a particular ju-
risdiction signi cantly reduces the demand for the externality-generating good,
then the producer price will also decrease which, in turn, tends to increase the
emissions abroad6. This suggests that, if the country is large in the sense that
its government can signi cantly in uence the world-market producer price of
the externality-generating good, then it may have incentives to modify its use
1Earlier literature on  scal policy under environmental externalities often abstracts from
international (or interregional) spillover e ects of environmental damage by focusing on ’one-
country’ model-economies. See the seminal contribution by Sandmo (1975) and the subsequent
work by e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Cremer and Gahvari (2001). See also the related
research on environmental policy reforms and so called ’double-dividends’, e.g. Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Parry et al. (1999) and Aronsson (1999).
2See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
3See Aronsson and Blomquist (2003).
4See Cremer and Gahvari (2004, 2005).
5See Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan and Silva (1999) and Aronsson et al. (2006).
6Various mechanisms by which emission-leakage may appear have been discussed by e.g.
Gurzgen and Rauscher (2000), Conconi (2003) and Lai and Hu (2005). See also the empirical
study by Sengupta and Bhardwaj (2004), which is a case study applied to India.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 3
of environmental policy. Our paper incorporates this mechanism into the theory
of income and commodity taxation.
As the number of countries is of no particular concern in what follows, the
present paper focuses on a two-country model, in which each country is charac-
terized by two-ability types. The countries interact both via the environmental
damage they impose on each other and international trade7. Our paper con-
tributes to the literature in primarily two ways. The  rst is by characterizing
the income, commodity and production tax structure, as well as the provision
of national public goods, in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each
country implements its own policy conditional on the policies chosen by the
other country. We show how the additional policy incentives associated with
the endogenous world-market producer price a ect the domestic use of income
taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision in a noncooperative
Nash equilibrium, relative to the policy rules that would apply with  xed pro-
ducer prices. Furthermore, our results show that the ability to in uence the
world-market producer price provides an incentive for each national govern-
ment to implement a production tax (in addition to the income and commodity
taxes) as well as to deviate from production e ciency in the public production.
The second is by analyzing the welfare e ects of policy coordination, where
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium constitutes the reference case. Although
the welfare e ects of policy coordination are typically ambiguous in the general
case, we show for a special case of the model that welfare improving policy
coordination may include, e.g., an increase in the production tax or commodity
tax accompanied by increased public production, or increased average income
taxation accompanied by increased public production. The intuition is that
each such reform contributes to reduced environmental damage (either directly
or indirectly via the world-market producer price).
The outline of the study is as follows. In section 2, we present the model, the
outcome of private optimization and market equilibrium conditions, whereas the
decision-problem of the government is discussed in section 3. Section 4 concerns
optimal taxation and public good provision at the national level, while policy
7We abstract from international factor mobility throughout the paper. Therefore, although
the policy incentives discussed below would also appear in a more general framework (with
factor mobility being yet another source of interaction between the countries), allowing for
factor mobility is clearly an important extension for future research.4 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
coordination is dealt with in section 5. We summarize and discuss the results
in section 6.
2 The Model
Consider an economy comprising two jurisdictions, which will be called ’coun-
tries’ in what follows. We begin by describing the consumers in each such
country. Having done that, we continue with the production side and market
equilibrium conditions.
2.1 The Consumers
In each country,  (where  =1 2), there are two types of consumers; a low-
ability type (denoted by ) and a high-ability type (denoted by ). The distinc-
tion between ability-types refers to productivity, meaning that the high-ability
type is more productive and faces a higher before-tax wage rate than the low-
ability type. Since the number of individuals of each such ability-type is not
important for the analysis to be carried out below, it will be normalized to one
for notational convenience.
The preferences of ability-type  ( = )i nc o u n t r y are described by
the utility function  = (	
 ),w h e r e denotes (the
consumption of) an environmentally clean good, 	 an environmentally dirty
good, 
 leisure,  a national public good and  the environmental damage.
We assume that  and 	 are normal goods. Leisure is de ned as 
 =

   ,w h e r e
 is a time endowment and  the hours of work. The
function (·) is increasing in , 	, 
 and , decreasing in  and strictly
quasiconcave. We also assume that the environmental damage is caused by
the aggregate consumption (measured over all countries) of the dirty good (see
below), and that the consumers treat  as exogenous. The clean good is untaxed
and its price is normalized to one. The consumer price of the dirty good is given
by  =  +,w h e r e is the producer price and  the commodity tax decided
upon by the government in country . Therefore, as both commodities are
subject to international trade, the producer prices are assumed to be equalized
across countries.
The consumer chooses , 	 and  to maximize utility subject to theMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 5
budget constraint,
    ¡
¢
     	 =0 ,( 1 )
where (·) is the income tax decided upon by the government in country .
Since the optimal tax and expenditure problem below will be de ned in terms
of conditional indirect utility functions, it is convenient to follow Christiansen
(1984) by solving the consumer’s optimization problem in two stages. In the
 rst stage, the utility maximization problem is solved conditional on the hours








 =  + 	
in which  is treated as a  xed post-tax income. The solution to this problem













and the conditional indirect utility function






In the second stage, we can derive the hours of work by maximizing the condi-
tional indirect utility function with respect to  subject to the budget con-
straint




The  rst order condition for this problem is written


 (1   






 =   and 

	 =  
 represent the marginal util-
ity of private income and leisure, respectively, while  =  is the labor6 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
income facing ability-type  in country  and 

 =  ¡
¢
 the corre-
sponding marginal income tax rate.
2.2 Production
The production side in each country consists of one public and two private












 is the amount of labor of ability-type  ( = ) that the public sector
uses. We assume that both inputs are essential, that the marginal product of
each factor is positive and diminishing, and that the production technology is
characterized by constant returns to scale.
Turning to private production, the clean good is produced in sector ,
whereas the dirty good is produced in sector . Production in each sector
is characterized by constant returns to scale. Given these characteristics, the
number of  rms in each sector is not, itself, important and will be normalized to













 represent the amount of labor of ability-type  used by sector
 and , respectively, in country . Normalizing with respect to the low-skilled













































We assume that the government implements a revenue tax in sector  at
the rate , while the good produced in sector  is untaxed. We also assume
that the workers are perfectly mobile between sectors (yet immobile between
countries), which means that the type-speci c wage rates in each country will
be the same in both sectors. The  rst order conditions for pro t maximization








































































By using equations (9) together with the identities














we can de ne , 

 and 
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for  = . By substituting equations (13) and (14) into the production func-
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Since the two goods are subject to international trade, the equilibrium con-









	 =0 . (17)
As long as equation (17) is ful lled, Walras’ law implies that the market for
the clean good is in equilibrium as well. By using  =  + , equation (17)






























for  =1 2.
To derive equation (18), we have used  = 
  
 and suppressed the time
endowment.
The environmental damage facing the residents in each country equals the







3 The Public Decision-Problem






The tax instruments are the production tax, income tax and commodity tax,
which are used for purposes of redistribution and public good provision. There-














8This formulation can be exempli ed by the climate problem.
9Alternative approaches would be to assume (as in many comparable studies) that the
government is maximizing the utility of one ability-type subject to a minimum utility restric-
tion for the other, or to assume that the government uses a general social welfare function.
All qualitative results derived below would hold also under the alternative formulations.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 9
where  = ()!
Since  (·) is a general labor income tax, which can be used to implement
any desired combination of consumption and hours of work for each ability-
t y p e ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ou s e, ,  and , instead of the parameters
of the income tax function, as direct decision-variables in the optimal tax and
expenditure problem. Therefore, let us rewrite the budget constraint of the
government by combining equation (21) with the individual budget constraints
and the zero pro t conditions following from the assumption of constant returns










The informational assumptions are conventional; the government observes
the income of each individual, although ability is private information. The
latter means that, in the absence of appropriate type-revealing mechanisms,
the government would not be able to observe whether any given worker is a
low-ability or high-ability type. We concentrate on the ’normal’ case, where the
government wants to redistribute from the high-ability to the low-ability type.
Therefore, the relevant aspect of self-selection is to prevent the high-ability type
from pretending to be a low-ability type. The self-selection constraint that may
bind then becomes
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the amount of leisure consumed by the mimicker. The term "
 =  # 1
denotes the wage ratio (or relative wage rate) in country . By using equations
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in which  is determined by equation (18). Note that the mimicker faces the
same before-tax and disposable income as the low-ability type; however, as the
mimicker is more productive than the low-ability type, he/she also consumes
more leisure than the low-ability type.
The Lagrangean can be written as10 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
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for  =1 2, where  ,  , ˆ  , 	, 

 and 
 were de ned above, whereas
$, %
, & and ' are Lagrange multipliers. Note also that  is endogenous to
the national government in country  and determined by equation (18). The







 , ,  and . Note also that equation (19) appears as an explicit
constraint in the Lagrangean, meaning that  w i l lb et r e a t e da sa na d d i t i o n a l
(and arti cial) decision-variable. The  rst order conditions are presented in the
Appendix.
4 The Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium
It is convenient to start the analysis by evaluating how an increase in the world-
market producer price of the externality-generating good a ects the national

























for * 6= ,w h e r e(
 =1+ + 0,a n d)	 = 
  
P
= 	 is the net
export of the dirty good.
Equation (24) shows that the welfare e ect of an increase in  can be decom-
posed into three parts. The  rst term on the right hand side appears because
the wage ratio depends on the producer price of the dirty good. If "
 + 0,
a higher producer price leads to an increase in the wage ratio, which makes
mimicking less attractive and contributes to relax the self-selection constraint.
In this case, therefore, the  rst term within the square bracket contributes to
higher welfare. By analogy, if "
 # 0, the  rst term within the square
bracket contributes to lower welfare. The second term, &)	(
,r e p r e s e n t sa
terms of trade e ect. If the country is a net exporter of the dirty good, a higher
producer price increases the value of the net exports which, in turn, leads toMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 11
higher welfare for country . The opposite argument applies if the country is a
net importer of the dirty good.
The  nal term on the right hand side of equation (24) arises because an
increase in the producer price of the dirty good leads to a lower demand for the
dirty good in the other country (conditional on the commodity tax implemented
by the other country). This e ect reduces the environmental damage which, in
turn, leads to increased welfare for country  if '& + 0, and decreased welfare
for country  if '& # 0. We can interpret '& as the real shadow price
that the government in country  attaches to a reduction in the environmental
damage. The determination of this shadow price is the issue to which we will
turn next.
Following earlier research on environmental policy and mixed taxation10,
it is convenient to de ne the shadow price of environmental damage over the
shadow price of the government’s budget constraint, '&, as this real shadow
price will play an important role in the optimal tax and expenditure policy to
be analyzed below. One may interpret '& as the marginal value that the
government in country  attaches to reduced environmental damage measured
in terms of its tax revenues. Let us de ne
, 

 =  
 
   \ , 

 =  
 ˆ  
 ˆ  
as the marginal willingness to pay for a small reduction in the environmen-
tal damage by ability-type  and the mimicker, respectively. To simplify the
exposition, we will also use the following short notations11;
10See e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) and Aronsson et
al. (2006).
11Note that  is calculated by using the  rst order conditions for ,  and ,
which explains why compensated derivatives of the demand for the dirty good in country 
appear in the expression for  along with uncompensated derivatives of the demand for
the dirty good in the other country, . The intuition is that the government in country  only
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which refer to, respectively, (i) the increased net supply of the dirty good caused
by an increase in the producer price, i.e. the partial derivative of equation
(17) with respect to , (ii) the change in the compensated demand for the
dirty good caused by increased environmental damage, (iii) the environmental
feedback e ect that would apply under a  xed producer price, and (iv) the full
environmental feedback e ect. The component (1 .)-. of the expression for
1  . measures the change in the producer price12 of the dirty good that would
arise from a marginal decrease in  which, if multiplied by
P
(	),
gives the corresponding change in the demand for the dirty good in the other
country (country *). Consider Proposition 1;
Proposition 1. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the shadow price of
environmental damage over the shadow price of the government’s budget con-
straint in country i can be written as
'










































12As the national government recognizes the domestic budget consequences of its envi-
ronmental policy, this e ect is calculated with the domestic utility held constant. See also
footnote 11.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 13
Proof: See the Appendix.
The environmental feedback e ect,   ., captures that a change in the externality
- due to a change in the demand for the dirty good - ’feeds back’ into the demand
equations (both directly and indirectly via the world-market producer price).
To guarantee stability of the model, we follow earlier literature13 by assuming
that the environmental feedback e ect is positive.
In the  rst row, all terms within the square bracket are well understood from
earlier research (e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala 1997), and our discussion of each of
these components will, therefore, be brief. The consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for reduced environmental damage is captured by the  rst term, which
(by the assumptions made earlier) contributes to increase the marginal value
that the government attaches to reduced environmental damage. The second
term appears because a change in  will a ect the self-selection constraint.
If the low-ability type is willing to pay more (less) at the margin than the
mimicker for reduced environmental damage, the government attaches a higher
(lower) marginal value to reduced environmental damage than it would other-
wise have done, as a reduction in  in this case contributes to relax (tighten)
the self-selection constraint. As for the  nal term, note that a change in the
environmental damage in uences the revenues from the commodity tax: if a
reduction in  leads to increased tax revenues via the demand for the dirty
good, ceteris paribus, then the tax revenue e ect reinforces the environmental
motive behind the public policy and contributes, therefore, to increase '&.
The opposite argument applies if an increase in  leads to higher tax revenues.
The second row of the formula for '& appears because the world-market
producer price of the dirty good is endogenous to the government in coun-
try . Suppose, to begin with, that 1   . # 0, in which case an increase in
the environmental damage (with the utility facing the domestic residents held
constant at the optimum) leads to a higher world-market producer price of
the dirty good14, ceteris paribus. In this case, and if "
 + 0 (# 0), which
means that a higher (lower) producer price contributes to relax the self-selection
13See Sandmo (1980). See also, e.g., Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson and
Blomquist (2003).
14Although 1   	 cannot be signed unambiguously in the general case, we show in the
Appendix that it is negative if the environmental damage is weakly separable from the other
goods in the utility function.14 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
constraint, the government will attach a lower (higher) value to reduced envi-
ronmental damage than it would otherwise have done. Note also that country
 may either be a net exporter or net importer of the dirty good: if country
 is a net exporter, so )	 + 0, the second term on the right hand side con-
tributes to reduce '&, while it contributes to increase '& if country  is
a net importer of the dirty good. The intuition is, of course, that the higher
world-market producer price (caused by increased environmental damage) gen-
erates an extra bene t if the country is a net exporter and an extra cost if the
country is a net importer. Interpretations analogous to those discussed above
- yet with the opposite qualitative e ects of the terms in the second row - will
follow if 1   . + 0.
In the interpretations of the optimal tax formulas to be presented below,
we will add the (realistic) assumption that the government attaches a positive
marginal value to reduced environmental damage, i.e. '& + 0.
4.1 Commodity Taxation
Let us now turn to the commodity tax structure. To simplify the analysis, we











for * 6= , for a scale variable that in uences the relationship between the
commodity tax on the dirty good and the shadow price that the government
attaches to reduced environmental damage. This scale variable will be further
discussed below. Consider Proposition 2;
Proposition 2. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the commodity tax on
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The  rst two terms on the right hand side are due to the self-selection constraint
and are analogous to results derived in earlier research (Edwards et al. 1994Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 15
and Naito 1999). As  ˜ 	 # 0, the  rst term on the right hand side
is positive if leisure is complementary with the dirty good in the sense that
	   ˆ 	 # 0, and negative if leisure is substitutable for the dirty good in
the sense that 	   ˆ 	 + 0. The intuition is that the government may relax
the self-selection constraint by implementing a higher (lower) commodity tax on
goods that are complementary with (substitutable for) leisure, ceteris paribus15.
The second term on the right hand side appears because a higher commodity
tax reduces the world-market producer price of the dirty good which, in turn,
a ects the wage distribution. If "
 + 0 (# 0), an increase in this producer
price makes mimicking less (more) attractive, which provides an incentive for
the government to implement a lower (higher) commodity tax than it would
otherwise have done.
The third term on the right hand side of the tax formula in Proposition
2 represents a terms of trade e ect; as such, its qualitative in uence on the
tax depends on whether country  is a net exporter or a net importer of the
dirty good. If the country is a net exporter, meaning that )	 + 0,ah i g h e r
producer price of the dirty good increases the value of the net export which,
itself, is welfare improving and can be accomplished by lowering the commodity
tax (recall that  # 0). In this case, therefore, the third term on the right
hand side contributes to reduce the commodity tax. The e ect would be the
opposite, if country  is a net importer of the dirty good.
The desire to correct for the externality imposed on the domestic residents is
captured by the fourth term on the right hand side, which re ects the additivity
property discussed by Sandmo (1980). However, an important di erence by
comparison with earlier literature is that this e ect is here scaled down with the
factor / # 1. The intuition is that, by implementing a smaller  than would be
required by full (domestic) externality-correction, it follows that the domestic
demand for the dirty good increases. Such a policy leads to a higher world-
market producer price of the dirty good which, in turn, reduces the demand for
the dirty good by the residents in the other country. The latter contributes to
reduce  and is, therefore, welfare improving from the point of view of country
.
15Recall that the mimicker faces the same before-tax and disposable income as the low-
ability type. Therefore, in the special case where leisure is weakly separable in terms of the
utility function, we have 
   ˆ 
 =0 .16 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
To further highlight the interpretation of the fourth term on the right hand
side of the tax formula in Proposition 2, i.e. in order to focus solely on
externality-correction, we consider the following special case;
Corollary 1. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium ()	 =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (%
 =0 ), the commodity tax





The corollary means that the commodity tax falls short of the marginal value
that each national government attaches to reduced environmental damage; in
other words, the externality-correcting tax falls short of the tax that would
follow from a standard Pigouvian tax formula for the domestic economy, i.e.
'&. Therefore, and by comparison with a globally optimal resource allocation,
each national government does not only neglect that the environmental damage
generated by the domestic residents a ects the well-being of the residents in the
other country; it also reduces the tax below the marginal value it attaches to the
domestic externality in order to increase the world-market producer price of the
externality-generating good, which reinforces the ine cient use of environmental
policy in the Nash equilibrium.
4.2 The Production Tax
In a standard model for mixed taxation with  xed producer prices, in which
the environmental damage depends on the aggregate consumption of the dirty
good, production taxes would be redundant. In our framework, on the other
hand, the production tax is not redundant. We can derive the following result;
Proposition 3. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the production tax
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in which  + 0 and
P
 
  # 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 has a simple interpretation: if an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare, then the government in
country  will implement a positive (negative) production tax on the dirty good.
Note also that, although the endogeneity of the world-market producer price is
the only mechanism via which the production tax is operative, the production
tax will, nevertheless, serve multiple purposes. This is seen from equation (24),
where the national welfare e ect of an increase in the world-market producer
price is shown to depend on (i) a component relating to the wage distribution
(which is due solely to the self-selection constraint), (ii) a terms of trade e ect
and (iii) a component representing externality-correction.
To illustrate the corrective role of the production tax more thoroughly, con-
sider once again the special case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which we also
add the assumption that the self-selection constraint does not bind;
Corollary 2. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium ()	 =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (%
 =0 ), the production tax in
country i reduces to










for * 6= .
In this case, therefore, the only reason for implementing a (positive) production
tax is to increase the world-market producer price of the dirty good, which
provides environmental bene ts to country  as the consumption of the dirty
good in the other country decreases. The motivation for using the corrective
production tax highlighted by the corollary also relates to a more general result:
if the government has fewer e ective policy instruments than the number of
variables it wishes to control, then the commodity tax on the dirty good no
longer constitutes a perfect environmental policy instrument. The intuition is
that the domestic government cannot use the commodity tax to control both the
domestic and foreign consumption of the dirty good. Therefore, the government
also uses other policy instruments - in this case the production tax - for the
explicit purpose of externality-correction.18 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
4.3 Labor Income Taxation
The arguments behind the use of commodity and production taxation also carry
over, in a natural way, to the incentive structure underlying marginal income



















denote the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and private (disposable)
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 +  ˜ 	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-
for how the conditional compensated demand for the dirty good changes in
response to an increase in the use of leisure by ability-type , and how the
world-market producer price responds to a utility-compensated increase in the
labor supply by ability-type , respectively. Consider the following result;
Proposition 4. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the marginal income
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The tax formulas in Proposition 4 distinguish between three basic motives for
in uencing the hours of work; (i) to relax the self-selection constraint (via chan-
nels not directly linked to the world-market producer price), (ii) to compensate
the consumer for distortions created by the (less  exible) commodity tax, and
(iii) to in uence the world-market producer price of the dirty good.
We start by discussing the marginal income tax rate implemented for the
low-ability type. The  rst motive for using income taxation mentioned above is
captured by the  rst row on the right hand side, where both terms are analogous
to results derived in earlier research (Stiglitz 1982). As the mimicker needs to
forego less leisure than the low-ability type to accomplish a given increase in
the before-tax income, one can show that ,1

	   "
\ ,1

	 + 0,w h i c h
means that the  rst term on the right hand side contributes to increase the
marginal income tax rate. The second term on the right hand side in the tax
formula for the low-ability type, and the  rst term on the right hand side in
the tax formula for the high-ability type, re ect that a change in the hours
of work a ects the wage distribution. If (as in Stiglitz 1982) "
 # 0
and "
 + 0, a decrease in the hours of work supplied by the low-ability
type and an increase in the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type will
contribute to reduce the wage inequality and, therefore, relax the self-selection
constraint. As a consequence, these e ects contribute to increase the marginal
income tax rate of the low-ability type and decrease the marginal income tax
rate of the high-ability type.
The  rst part of the second row in each tax formula in Proposition 4 serves
to compensate the consumer for distortions created by the commodity tax16.
To see the intuition behind this result, note that the government has no direct
motive besides externality-correction to distort the consumption of the dirty
good; in other words, the self-selection component, the terms of trade e ect
and the producer price e ect only appear in the commodity tax formula in
Proposition 2 because the government lacks direct tax instruments to relax the
self-selection constraint and/or fully control the world-market producer price.
16This motive for using marginal income taxation was also addressed by Aronsson et al.
(2006); let be in a simpli ed model without asymmetric information.20 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
Therefore, if  6= '& at the optimum, the government may (in part) use
marginal income taxation to compensate the consumers for the distortionary
e ect caused by the commodity tax. For instance, if  +' &,t h ec o m m o d i t y
tax is interpretable as being ’too high’ from the perspective of pure externality-
correction, in which case it is welfare improving to stimulate the consumption
of the dirty good. This constitutes, in turn, an incentive for the government
to implement a higher marginal income tax rate if leisure is complementary
with the dirty good ( ˜ 	
 + 0), and a lower marginal income tax rate
if leisure is substitutable for the dirty good ( ˜ 	
 # 0), than it would
otherwise have done. The argument will be the opposite if  #' &.
The second part of the second row in each tax formula in the proposition
depends on the joint e ect of two mechanisms; how the world-market producer
price of the dirty good changes in response to an increase in the hours of work
(captured by  ), and how an increase in the world-market producer price
a ects the domestic welfare (captured by L). If, as one would normally
expect, the world-market producer price decreases in response to an increase in
the hours of work supplied domestically in the sense that   # 0,a n di fa n
increase in the world-market producer price leads to higher domestic welfare,
there is an incentive for the government to implement a higher marginal income
tax rate for ability-type  than it would otherwise have done. The intuition be-
hind other possible sign-combinations for   and L is analogous. Once
again, note that the sign of L re ects a desire to reduce the wage in-
equality (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) and a desire to correct for
the environmental externality; therefore, the incentive created by the producer
price e ect is a mixture of several underlying motives for tax policy.
To take the interpretation of the second row of each tax formula in Propo-
sition 4 a bit further, we may use the expression for  in Proposition 2 and
substitute into the expressions for the marginal income tax rates. The second
row of the expression for the marginal income tax rate may then be rewritten





































In equation (25), the  rst term on the right hand side shows how a self-selection
component familiar from the commodity tax formula (see Proposition 2) reap-
pears in the expression for the marginal income tax rate. If 	   ˆ 	 # 0,i n
which case this self-selection component contributes to increase the commodity
tax (and, therefore, reduce the consumption of the dirty good, ceteris paribus),
there will be an incentive for the government to increase the consumption of the
dirty good via the income tax. With  ˜ 	
 + 0 (# 0), this mechanism
means that the government implements a higher (lower) marginal income tax
rate than it would otherwise have done. Incentive e ects opposite to those just
described will apply if 	   ˆ 	 + 0. The second term on the right hand
side is also straight forward; if L + 0, the government has an incentive
to increase , meaning that it will try to decrease the supply of the dirty good.
This may, in turn, be accomplished by discouraging the labor supply via a higher
marginal income tax rate. Again, the intuition is analogous if L # 0.
Finally, note that Proposition 4 does not presuppose that the production tax
is suboptimal from the perspective of the domestic government. In other words,
as the national government is not able to perfectly control the world-market
producer price of the externality-generating good by any single tax instrument,
all tax instruments will be used, in part, for the purpose of exercising (let be
imperfect) control of the world-market producer price.
As we did before, let us also here brie y address the corrective role of tax-
ation by considering the special case of a symmetric equilibrium, in which we
also add the assumption that the self-selection constraint does not bind. We
can then derive the following corollary to Proposition 4;
Corollary 3. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium ()	 =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (%
 =0 ), the marginal income








&2 + 0 for
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for  = , where










 + 0 for * 6= .
Therefore, in the special case, the government implements (positive) marginal
income tax rates in order to increase the world-market producer price. With 
held constant, this will reduce the foreign consumption of the dirty good, which
leads to higher domestic welfare.
























to be the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private













to be the marginal rate of transformation17 between the numeraire private good
and the public good. The provision of the public good is characterized by the
following optimality condition from the perspective of country ;
17Ac o s tb e n e   tr u l ee q u i v a l e n tt ot h a ti nP r o p o s i t i o n5c a nb ed e r i v e d ,i ft h e  r s to r d e r
condition for 

 (instead of the  rst order condition for 

 ) is used to calculate the marginal
rate of transformation between the numeraire private good and the public good. This is seen
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Proposition 5. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the provision of the









































Proof: See the Appendix.
Let us start by interpreting the  rst row of the formula in Proposition 5. The
left hand side represents the sum of marginal rates of substitution between the
public good and private consumption (i.e. the consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for the public good), whereas the right hand side contains the marginal
rate of transformation between the public good and the numeraire as well as a
direct e ect created by the self-selection constraint. Therefore, if the terms in
the second row were absent, and if leisure is substitutable for (complementary
with) the public good in the sense that ,1


   \ ,1


 + 0 (# 0), we
may relax the self-selection constraint by overproviding (underproviding) the
public good relative to the Samuelson rule. This result is well understood from
Boadway and Keen (1993).
The second row of the formula in Proposition 5 is, in a sense, analogous to
the corresponding e ects in the expressions for the marginal income tax rates
(given by the second row of each formula in Proposition 4). To see this more
clearly, suppose  rst that  +' &, in which case the commodity tax on the
dirty good is ’too high’ from the perspective of pure externality-correction. This
mechanism constitutes, in turn, an incentive for the government to stimulate the
consumption of the dirty private good by adjusting its provision of the public
good. Accordingly, if the public good is complementary with (substitutable
for) the dirty private good in the sense that  ˜ 	 + 0 ( ˜ 	 #
0), the government will provide more (less) of the public good than it would
otherwise have done. The interpretation is analogous - yet with the opposite
policy incentives - if  #' &. Once again, the intuition is that the government
uses its other policy instruments, in this case the public good, at least in part24 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
to compensate the consumers for the distortionary e ect created by the com-
modity tax18.
Turning  nally to the second part of the second row, which measures the
policy incentives associated with the world-market producer price of the dirty
good, there are two channels via which the provision of the public good can
in uence . The  rst is via the demand for the dirty good. To illustrate,
suppose  rst that an increase in the world-market producer price increases the
domestic welfare (due, for instance, to decreased consumption of the dirty good
abroad and/or that country  is a net exporter of the dirty good). In this case,
and if the public good is complementary with (substitutable for) the dirty good
in the sense that  ˜ 	 + 0 (# 0), an increase (a decrease) in  leads
to a higher world-market produce price and, therefore, higher domestic welfare.
The second channel by which the government may in uence the world-market
producer price of the dirty good is via the supply side. If the government
increases the supply of the public good, then the resources available to the
private sector will decrease which, in turn, reduces the supply of the dirty private
good. Again, the policy incentives will be the opposite to those just described if
an increase in the world-market producer price leads to lower domestic welfare.
The assumption that the world-market producer price is endogenous for
each national government is also important from the point of view of public
production. We can derive the following production-ine ciency result19;
Corollary 4. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the production of the






















The intuition behind this result is, of course, that a reallocation of low-ability
18Another possible interpretation of the  rst term in the second row is that it captures a tax
revenue e ect of the public good; see e.g. Edwards et al. (1994) for such an interpretation of
a corresponding term in a model without environmental externalities (i.e. where  =0 ).
This interpretation is, perhaps, less obvious in our framework, since     times the
change in the compensated conditional demand only measures part of the associated e ect on
the tax revenues.
19This is analogous to Naito (1999).Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 25
labor from private to public production does not, in general, a ect the world-
market producer price in the same way as a corresponding reallocation of high-
ability labor from private to public production. Therefore, this production-
ine ciency result is solely due to the ability of the national government to
in uence the world-market producer price: if this price were  xed (as in the
context of small open economies), the public production would be characterized
by production-e ciency.
Let us  nally consider the special case with a symmetric equilibrium with a
non-binding self-selection constraint, which we also did in connection to the op-
timal tax structure. The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition
5;
Corollary 5. In a symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium ()	 =0 ),
and if the self-selection constraint does not bind (%
 =0 ), the optimal provision







































In the special case exempli ed by the corollary, the government in country 
attempts to push up the world-market producer price of the dirty good in order
to reduce the environmental damage created abroad. It does so by overproviding
the public good relative to the Samuelson rule, which reduces the amount of
resources available to the private sector and, therefore, the supply of the dirty
private good.
5 Policy Coordination
As the noncooperative Nash equilibrium analyzed in section 4 is ine cient from
the perspective of both countries, policy coordination becomes interesting to
consider. Here, we do not interpret the concept of ’coordination’ such that the26 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
countries pool their resources in order to implement a cooperative equilibrium
(even if this is a common approach in earlier literature). It is more realistic
to assume that they agree upon smaller projects, the purposes of which are to
improve the resource allocation by comparison with the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium analyzed above. We will not discuss the conditions under which such
international agreements are likely to be formed; only the welfare consequences
if they arise.
Note that all public decision-variables have already been optimally chosen
on a national basis in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a coor-
dinated in nitessimal change in one or several policy instruments only a ects
welfare because changes in the public decision-variables in country  give rise to
welfare e ects in country * and vice versa. Let us begin by characterizing the
cost bene t rule. By observing that the national welfare function facing any
country, , equals the national Lagrangean in the noncooperative Nash equilib-
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Equation (26) implies that a policy reform may in uence welfare via two chan-
nels; a direct e ect on the foreign demand for the dirty good and an indirect
e ect via the world-market producer price. To simplify the analysis slightly,Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 27
let us add the (relatively common) assumption that the public good and the
environmental damage are both weakly separable from the other goods in terms
of the utility function. The simpli cation gained by this assumption is that nei-
ther the national public goods nor the environmental damage will directly a ect
the world-market producer price. Then, by assuming that the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium described in the previous section constitutes the prereform
equilibrium, and if each national government attaches a positive marginal value
to reduced environmental damage (as we assumed above), we can immediately
derive the following result from equation (26);
Proposition 6. If  is weakly separable in  and  and if L + 0
(# 0) for  =1 2, a coordinated increase (decrease) in the production tax
accompanied by a budget-balancing increase (decrease) in the resources spent
on public production - with the hours of work and disposable income of each
ability-type and the commodity tax held constant - leads to increased welfare.
Furthermore, if L + 0 and "
   0 for  =1 2, and if the net
export is small enough not to be a dominant source of welfare change following
increased commodity taxation, then a coordinated increase in the commodity
tax accompanied by a budget-balancing increase in the resources spent on public
production - with the hours of work and disposable income of each ability-type
and the production tax held constant - leads to increased welfare.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the  rst part of Proposition 6 is straight forward. A higher
production tax in, say, country * contributes to increase the world-market pro-
ducer price, ceteris paribus, which is desirable (undesirable) from the perspective
of country  if L + 0 (#). In addition, if country * uses the additional tax
revenues to increase the public production - while the income tax is adjusted
in such a way that the hours of work and private disposable income are held
constant - the world-market producer price will increase even further, since the
supply of the dirty good becomes smaller when resources are reallocated from
the private to the public sector. In the second part of the proposition, the
condition imposed on the net export is to avoid that that the sign of the na-
tional welfare change caused by an increase in the other country’s commodity
tax becomes dependent on whether the net export is positive or negative. The28 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
intuition behind the second part is that an increase in the commodity tax in
country * decreases the demand for the dirty good in country *;t h i si sw e l f a r e
improving for country  as long as the associated decrease in the world-market
producer price does not give rise to more wage inequality. Increased public
production then plays the same role as in the  rst part of the proposition.
To take the analysis a step further, and by analogy to Corollaries 1, 2, 3 and
5, let us consider policy coordination in the special case where the prereform
Nash equilibrium is symmetric and the self-selection constraint does not bind.
As before, this special case enables us to address the corrective role of the
tax and expenditure policies in a framework simple enough to derive several
unambiguous results. By focusing on pairwise changes, which is a minimum
requirement for budget balance for each national government, we can generalize
Proposition 6 as follows;
Proposition 7. If the prereform resource allocation is a symmetric noncooper-
ative Nash equilibrium, if the self-selection constraint does not bind, and given
the separability assumption in Proposition 6, it is welfare improving to;
(i) increase the production tax - while the hours of work and private disposable
income of each ability-type and the commodity tax are held constant - and then
use the additional tax revenues to increase the public production,
(ii) increase the commodity tax - while the hours of work and private disposable
income of each ability-type and the production tax are held constant - and then
use the additional tax revenues to increase the public production,
(iii) reduce the hours of work and private disposable income simultaneously for
each ability-type with the commodity and production taxes held constant, such
that the tax revenues remain  xed, provided that leisure is not a strong enough
substitute for the dirty good to completely o set the increase in the world-market
producer price caused by a decrease in the supply of the dirty good, or
(iv) reduce the private disposable income - while the hours of work as well as
the commodity and production taxes are held constant - and use the additional
tax revenues to increase the public production.
The intuition behind policy reforms (i) and (ii) is the same as in the context ofMixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 29
Proposition 6 above; the only di erence here is that the domestic welfare e ect











for ' + 0,  =1 2 and * 6= .
From the perspective of any country, , policy reform (iii) is interpretable
to mean 4 # 0, 4 # 0 and 4 = 4 = 4


 =0(for * 6=  and
 = ). Increased marginal income taxation in country * (which reduces )
is here accompanied by increased average income taxation (which reduces ).
A smaller number of work hours leads to reduced supply of the dirty private
good (recall that the resources used for public production are held constant),
which gives rise to an increase in the world-market producer price of the dirty
good. Furthermore, reduced private disposable income leads to lower demand
for the dirty good in country * which is, in turn, welfare improving from the
perspective of country .
Finally, and again from the perspective of country , we may interpret policy
reform (iv) to imply 4 # 0, 4


 + 0 and 4 = 4 = 4 =0(for * 6= 
and  = ). This can be accomplished by a combination of higher marginal
and average income taxation in such a way that the hours of work are held
constant. As we mentioned above, a reduction in the private disposable income
is, itself, welfare improving, as it leads to reduced demand for the dirty good
abroad. Spending the additional tax revenues on public production, then means
a reallocation of labor from the private to the public sector, which contributes
to increase the world-market producer price of the dirty good and, therefore,
decrease the foreign consumption of the dirty good.
6 Summary and Discussion
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public good provision in a two-
country economy, where each country is characterized by two-ability types and
asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. We
assume that one of the consumption goods, referred to as a ’dirty’ good, gives
rise to transboundary environmental damage. Each national government faces
a mixed tax problem, where the set of tax instruments consists of a nonlinear in-30 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
come tax as well as linear commodity and production taxes on the dirty good.
We also assume that each country is large in the sense that its government
may signi cantly in uence the world-market producer price of the externality-
generating commodity via its tax and expenditure policies. The idea is to
capture the incentives facing large actors on the environmental policy scene; an
issue neglected in earlier comparable literature on mixed taxation.
We would like to emphasize the following results;
• In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the corrective component of the
commodity tax falls fall short of the marginal value that the national government
attaches to reduced environmental damage.
• If, in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare - which, in turn, depends
on the properties of the wage distribution and whether or not the country is
a net exporter of the dirty good - the national government will implement a
positive (negative) production tax on the dirty good.
• If, in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, an increase in the world-market
producer price leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare - and by comparison
with the situation where the world-market producer price of the dirty good is
 xed - the public policy also re ects a motive to reduce (increase) the hours of
work and/or increase (decrease) the hours of work spent in public production
relative to the hours of work spent in private production. As a consequence, the
endogenous world-market producer price also a ects the incentives underlying
marginal income taxation and public good provision.
• The public production is characterized by production-ine ciency.
• In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the national government also (in
part) uses the income tax and provision of the public good to compensate the
consumers for distortions created by the commodity tax.
• Welfare improving policy coordination - where the noncooperative Nash equi-
librium constitutes the prereform equilibrium - may include increased commod-
ity and/or production taxation with the additional tax revenues spent on public
production.Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 31
As a complement to the more general model, we have also analyzed the correc-
tive role of taxation and public provision in a special case, where the nonco-
operative Nash equilibrium is symmetric and the self-selection constraint does
not bind. In the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, we can then show; (i) that
the commodity tax (which is, in this case, a pure environmental tax) falls short
of the marginal value that each national government attaches to reduced en-
vironmental damage, (ii) that each national government implements a positive
production tax, and (iii) that the marginal income tax rates and level of the
public good are higher than they would have been had the government perceived
the world-market producer price of the dirty good as  xed. In addition to the
policy coordination result mentioned above, we show in the special case that
(iv) a simultaneous coordinated increase in the marginal and average tax rates
(in both countries), and (v) a simultaneous coordinated increase in the aver-
age tax rate and the provision of the public good, can be designed to increase
welfare by comparison with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium.
Possible extensions of the analysis carried out here would be to consider a
model that contains both small and large open economies (which di er with
respect to the perceived endogeneity of the world-market producer price) and
by incorporating the individual jurisdictions into an economic federation. We
leave these and other extensions for future research.32 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
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i nw h i c hw eh a v eu s e dt h a t
 =
P
 	 +)	, where )	 is the net export
of the dirty good. To simplify the expression for L,d e   n e
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for * 6=  (note that * is used here to denote the ’other country’). Therefore, by
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 for  =  into equation (A9). Next, use











































































for * 6= .
Note that the expression within the square bracket in the second row of
















































































Finally, by observing that the expression for L in equation (24) directly
depends on '&, we can derive the formula in Proposition 1.¥
Note also that if  is weakly separable in terms of the utility function, 1 .
reduces to





 # 0. (A.18)
Proof of Proposition 2
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+ 0 for  = . (A.21)
Therefore, the expression within the square bracket in the second row of equa-





























where   =
P
  ˜ 	 # 0. Finally, by using the expression for L in
equation (24) and substituting into equation (A22), we obtain the formula in
Proposition 2.¥
Proof of Proposition 3
























where  =  (
)- + 0. Rearrangement gives the tax formula in
the proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider  rst the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type. By combin-
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By substituting equations (A28) and (A29) into equation (A25), we obtain
the expression for the marginal income tax rate of the low-ability type in the
proposition. The procedure to derive the marginal income tax rate of the high-
ability type is analogous.¥
Proof of Proposition 5
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from equation (A7), gives the formula for public good provision in the proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 6
The  rst part of the proposition follows by observing that the welfare e ect is
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 + 0 ( # 0)i f
L
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+ 0 ( # 0).Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary... 39
Therefore, a simultaneous increase (decrease) in the production tax accompa-
nied by a corresponding adjustment of the public production is welfare improv-
ing if L + 0 (# 0).
























































Since the term within the square bracket in the second row of equation (A34)
is between zero and one, "
   0 by assumption and  # 0, it follows
that 5

 + 0 if the net export (which can take any sign) is su ciently small. The
proof is then analogous to the proof of the  rst part of the proposition.¥40 Mixed Taxation, Public Goods and Transboundary...
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of coordinated tax re-
forms in an economy where a transboundary environmental externality
and an international wage bargaining externality are operative at the
same time. We assume that the wage in each country is decided upon
in a bargain between trade-unions and  rms, and the wage bargaining
externality arises because the fall-back pro t facing  rms depends on the
pro t they can earn if moving production abroad. Using the noncoop-
erative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, our results imply that the
international wage bargaining externality may either reinforce or weaken
the welfare gain of a coordinated increase in environmental taxation, de-
pending on (among other things) how the reform a ects the wage. For a
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In today’s world, both economists and policy makers generally agree that trans-
boundary environmental problems require international policy coordination,
since uncoordinated actions taken by national governments are unlikely to give
rise to an e cient resource allocation from the perspective of society as a whole.
This is so because country-speci c objectives and constraints can be expected
to govern the policies decided upon by national governments, meaning that (the
transboundary) part of the externality will remain uninternalized. At the same
time, a full cooperative equilibrium may be beyond reach for a variety of rea-
sons. It is, therefore, relevant to analyze the welfare consequences of partial
policy coordination, where the purpose is to improve the resource allocation by
comparison to the initial (uncoordinated) equilibrium. This is the topic of the
present paper, which focuses on the role of trade-union wage formation in this
particular context.
The bulk of earlier literature that analyzes tax and expenditure coordina-
tion assumes that the labor market is competitive. However, since the 1970s,
many European countries have su ered from high unemployment rates, and it
seems unlikely that full employment will be restored in the near future. As
trade-unions are important actors in the European labor markets, it has been
argued1 that the wage bargaining structure may create an additional interna-
tional externality. The argument is that the threat of moving production abroad
may be used by  rms during wage bargaining as a tool to moderate wage claims.
A key factor determining the credibility of the  rms’ threat is the size of the
potential pro t they can obtain by moving production abroad. The larger the
potential outside pro t, the stronger will be the  rms’ bargaining position vis-
a-vis the trade-unions, and the lower will be the wage. As a consequence, if the
policies undertaken by the national government in uences the pro ts of domes-
tic  rms, it will also give rise to an international externality. The intuition is, of
course, that a national government is unlikely to consider how its policies a ect
the outcome of wage bargaining in other countries.
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the welfare consequences of
coordinated tax reforms in an economy where a transboundary environmental
externality and the international wage bargaining externality are operative at
1See Aronsson and Sjögren (2004b).2 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
the same time. This is an interesting extension of the literature on environmen-
tal policy reforms because if the wage bargaining externality is non-negligible,
previous studies have omitted a potentially important mechanism when they
evaluate the welfare e ects of such reforms. Our study is based on a multi-
country economy, in which production gives rise to environmental damage and
capital is mobile across countries. Each national government can use both
distortionary taxes and lump-sum taxes to raise tax revenue, meaning that
distortionary taxation will be used solely for externality correction. The tax
instruments available to each national government are an emission tax (i.e. a
tax on a dirty production factor), a capital tax and lump-sum taxes.
We start the analysis by characterizing the emission and capital taxes in
a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where each national government treats the
policies decided upon by the other countries as exogenous. An interesting result
here is that the wage bargaining externality may (itself) give rise to an incentive
for tax competition. Then, we derive and characterize the welfare e ects of
coordinated increases in the emission and capital tax, respectively. The central
question is whether the appearance of the wage bargaining externality reinforces,
or weakens, the arguments for policy coordination. Using the noncooperative
Nash equilibrium as a reference case, our results imply that the international
wage bargaining externality may either reinforce or weaken the welfare gain of
a coordinated increase in the emission tax depending on (among other things)
how this reform a ects the wage. For a special case where the consumers have
quasi-linear utility functions and the production function is of Cobb-Douglas
type, we also derive an exact condition under which a coordinated increase in
the emission tax leads to higher welfare.
There is a relatively large literature dealing with di erent aspects of envi-
ronmental policy coordination. One body of literature focuses on the incentives
underlying the establishment of coalitions.2 Another deals explicitly with the
implementation of such arrangements by applying theories of optimal taxation
or theories of policy reforms in the context of multi-country economies with
transboundary environmental damage.3 Over the last decade, a number of
studies have also emerged where  scal and labor market distortions operate si-
2See, e.g. Mäler (1989), Barrett (1994) and Carraro (2003).
3See, e.g. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992), Aronsson and Löfgren (2000), Aronsson
and Blomquist (2003) and Aronsson et al (2006).Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 3
multaneously with environmental externalities.4 However, most earlier research
on economic policy, where environmental damage and labor market distortions
jointly a ect the policy outcome, abstracts from international spillover e ects
of environmental damage.5
Although the present paper is not primarily concerned with tax competition,
it is, nevertheless, related to the literature dealing with taxation of labor and
capital in economies with international capital mobility. Most studies in this
area are based on the assumption that the labor markets are competitive.6
One exception is Koskela and Schöb (2002), who analyze the optimal use of
labor and capital taxes in an open economy with union- rm wage bargaining.
They show that capital should generally be taxed at a higher rate than labor,
because labor supply is locally in nitely elastic in an economy with equilibrium
unemployment. Another exception is Fuest and Huber (1999), who show that
coordinated increases in the labor and capital tax rates may actually lead to
lower welfare, if the economies are characterized by unemployment.
However, none of these studies have addressed the above mentioned wage
bargaining externality. The main contribution of the present study is that it
examines how the wage bargaining externality in uences the welfare e ects of
coordinated increases in the emission tax and capital tax. Therefore, since the
welfare e ects of policy coordination associated with the environmental exter-
nality and the wage bargaining externality, respectively, may either reinforce
or counterbalance each other, we are able to analyze under what circumstances
countries are likely to gain from (and take part of) such policy coordination. In
addition, there are few earlier studies dealing with international environmental
policy in economies with imperfectly competitive labor markets, meaning that
our study also contributes more generally by focusing on the role of the wage
formation system in the context of environmental policy coordination.
The outline of the study is as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic
model. Section 3 concerns the tax and expenditure policy that each country
4See, for example, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and
B o v e n b e r ga n dv a nd e rP l o e g( 1 9 9 8 ) .
5Exceptions are Hoel (1997) and Aronsson et al (2006).
6The potential ine ciency associated with tax competition has been analyzed by e.g.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1989), and it is argued that uncoodinated
tax policies lead to ine ciently low tax rates (e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991). Therefore,
tax policy coordination may be used to improve the resource allocation. For a survey of the
welfare economics of tax coordination, see Keen (1993).4 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
would implement in an uncoordinated equilibrium. In Section 4, we analyze
the welfare e ects of a coordinated increase in the emission tax and capital tax,
respectively. The paper is summarized in Section 5.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the behavior of consumers,  rms and trade-unions as
well as the equilibrium conditions characterizing the private sector. The public
policy implemented by each national government in an uncoordinated equilib-
rium and the welfare e ects of policy coordination are analyzed in Sections 3
and 4, respectively.
2.1 Consumers and Firms
Consider an economy comprising 
 identical countries. In each country, com-
petitive  rms produce a single output using three factors of production; labor,
, capital, 7 and energy, . We assume that the use of energy has a detrimen-
tal e ect on the environment in the sense of causing transboundary pollution.
Since the production sector is competitive, each  rm perceives that its actions
do not in uence the aggregate economy, meaning means that each  rm treats
prices and the environmental damage as exogenous. Given these characteris-
tics, the number of  rms in each country is, itself, not important and will be
normalized to one.
The production function,  (7), is increasing and strictly concave in
each argument, and the inputs are complements in production in the sense that
   + 0. In addition, the production is characterized by decreasing
returns to scale.7 Normalizing the price of output to one, the  rm’s pro t is
given by
 = (7)     87    (1)
where  is the wage, 8 the interest rate and  an energy tax.8 The  rst order
7The reason for having decreasing returns to scale is that the labor market is dominated
by trade unions. To be able to characterize the wage bargain between the unions and  rms,
the labor demand function must be well de ned.
8We assume that the supply of energy is in nitely elastic. In addition, and without loss
of generality, we normalize the marginal cost of producing energy to zero, meaning that theDoes Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 5
conditions are  (·)=,  (·)=8 and  (·)=, which implicitly de ne the
factor demand functions
 = (8)7= 7 (8)=  (8) (2)
and the pro t function  (8).
Turning to the consumption side, there are three types of consumers; em-
ployed workers, unemployed workers and  rm-owners. The consumers share a
common utility function, which is written as
9()+:() (3)
where  is consumption and  denotes environmental quality. The functions
9(·) and :(·) are increasing and strictly concave in their respective argument.
The total number of workers will be denoted by ,, out of which    , are
employed and ,    unemployed. The number of  rm-owners is normalized
to one for notational convenience. Variables associated with consumer-types
will be superindexed ; (employed worker), 9 (unemployed worker) and  ( rm-
owner), respectively.
Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically. The reason for assum-
ing  xed labor supply per worker is that the link between distortionary taxes,
endogenous labor supply and wage formation in unionized economies has been
analyzed thoroughly in earlier literature.9 Therefore, to be able to focus on the
novel aspects of this paper in the simplest possible way, we disregard endogenous
labor supply here.
Each (employed and unemployed) worker is endowed with a  xed and divis-
ible capital asset, ¯ *, which can be invested at home and/or abroad. Capital is
taxed at source, meaning that the amount invested at home gives the net return
(1   5)8, while investments abroad generate the the net return (1   5
)8,i n
which 8 is the interest rate and 5 the capital income tax rate. Variables indexed
by "*" are non-domestic.
Equilibrium in the global capital market implies equalization of net capital
returns, i.e.
(1   5)8 =( 1  5
)8.( 4 )
energy price paid by the  nal goods producer equals the energy tax.
9See e.g. Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a,b).6 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
By using equation (4), the capital income (net of taxation) can be written as < =
(1   5
)8¯ *, and the budget constraint facing each employed and unemployed
worker, respectively, becomes
 =  + <    (5)
 = = + < (6)
in which  is the lump-sum tax10 per employed worker, and = an unemployment
bene t.
Let us  nally turn to the  rm-owner. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the  rm-owner does not work; instead, he/she receives pro t income,  ,
and pays a lump-sum tax, . This means that the  rm-owner´s consumption
is given by  =   .
The environmental quality is given by




where ¯  is an exogenous measure of the potential environmental quality that
would prevail in the absence of pollution. Since there are 
 countries in the
economy, and pollution is transboundary, the actual environmental quality fac-
i n gt h er e s i d e n t si na n yc o u n t r yi se q u a lt o ¯  minus the total energy use (i.e.
the sum of emissions across countries). Therefore, since there is a one-to-one
correspondence between energy use and emissions here, the terms "energy tax",
"emission tax" and "environmental tax" will be used synonymously in what
follows.
2.2 The Labor Market
We assume that all workers are trade-union members, and that wage formation
is decentralized in the sense that each trade-union (i) is  rm speci c and (ii)
treats the policy instruments of the government as exogenous. Therefore, in
accordance with the treatment of the production sector above, we normalize
the number of trade-unions to one. Following Oswald (1993), the objective
10When the labor supply is  xed, a proportional labor income tax is equivalent to a lump-
sum tax. This is why we use the latter tax instrument.Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 7
function of the trade-union is assumed to coincide with the objective function
of the member with median seniority. This means that the trade-union members
are ranked according to (exogenous) seniority, and that the member with median
seniority is the decisive voter. As long as the median voter is not at an immediate
risk of becoming unemployed, the trade-union will be indi erent to the level
of employment. Within our framework, this means that the median voter’s
objective is to maximize 9()+: () subject to the employment restriction
(8)   ,2.
The wage formation part of the model is governed by the right-to-manage
framework11, meaning that the wage rate is determined in a bargain between the
union and the  rm. If no contract is signed, the median union member becomes
unemployed, so that his/her fall-back utility is given by 9()+: (). The  rm,
on the other hand, has the option to move production abroad, in which case its
fall-back pro t is given by  (8 ) >,w h e r e> is a  xed moving cost. By
using the short notations 9 = 9()+:(), 9 = 9()+:(),  =  ( 8)
and   =  ( 8 ), and then de ning 9   9 and     (    >) to be
the union’s and the  rm’s respective rents from bargaining, the outcome of the
bargain will be the wage that maximizes the Nash product
 =[ 9( + <   )   9(= + <)]
 [ (8)    (8 )+>]
1 (8)
where ?   (01) is the trade union’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the  rm. If
? =0 , the  rm unilaterally determines the wage, which is then pushed down
to the market clearing level where (8)=,. On the other hand, if ? =1
the union has monopoly power and pushes up the wage so that the employment
restriction (8)=,2 will bind.
The  rst order condition for an interior solution with respect to the wage
can be written as
  = ?9

 (      + >)   (1   ?)(9   9)=0 (9)
where the second-order condition,   # 0, is assumed to be satis ed. Equation
(9) implicitly de nes the bargained wage as
 = (=<8    >). (10)
11See Oswald (1985).8 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
For the analysis below, we observe that the bargained wage rate satis es the
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Equations (11) and (12) are standard. Equation (13) shows that the wage
response to an increase in the nonlabor income comprises two counteracting
e ects. First, the employed workers now have a higher total income, meaning
that the union can reduce its wage claims. Second, as an increase in < also
increases the income of the unemployed, the union can be more aggressive in
its wage demands. The net e ect of these two forces is ambiguous. Finally,
equation (14) shows that an increase in the fall-back pro t contributes to reduce
the bargained wage; a property which will be important below.
3 Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium
We assume that the national government faces a utilitarian welfare function,
which is given by








The government raises revenue via the lump-sum taxes paid by the employed
workers and the  rm-owner, respectively, the capital income tax and the emis-
sion tax. The revenue is used to  nance an unemployment bene t. Therefore,
the policy instruments are , , , 5 and =, and the government´s budget
constraint is written as
 + 587 +  +    =(,   )=0 . (16)Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 9
Each national government also recognizes that the environmental quality is
determined by equation (7). In addition, as the national governments are Nash
competitors to one another, each national government treats the policies decided
upon by the other countries (i.e. , , , 5
 and =) as exogenous.
The Lagrangian corresponding to the government´s decision-problem can be
written as
L =   + &
£
 + 587 +  +    =(,   )
¤
(17)
where & is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The
 rst order conditions are presented in the Appendix. Here, we concentrate on
the implications of these conditions for optimal taxation.
To begin with, let us de ne the welfare gain of increased employment, i.e.
marginal value that the national government attaches to an increase in the
number of employed persons. By di erentiating the Lagrangean in equation
(17) with respect to , using the private  rst order conditions and rearranging,
we obtain
 =( 9   9)+& ( + =). (18)
Equation (18) decomposes the welfare e ect of increased employment into two
parts. First, each worker who becomes employed experiences a direct utility gain
equal to 9   9 + 0. Second, the net e ect on tax revenue if one additional
worker goes from unemployment to employment is given by  + =.I f t h e
government aims to redistribute from the employed to the unemployed, meaning
that  + =+0,w eh a v e  + 0.
We show in the Appendix that each national government implements the
following emission and capital taxes in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium;
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and ' =1 (1   ).
The variable ' is interpretable in terms of wage compensation for increased
taxation; if  + 1( # 1), workers are "overcompensated" ("undercom-
pensated") in terms of the wage response. Therefore, 1' =1  is the
degree of undercompensation and, as a consequence, ' the inverse of the degree
of undercompensation.
To interpret the tax policy summarized by equations (19) and (20), consider
 rst the special case where the labor market is competitive. In a competitive
labor market (where    ,), one can show that the emission tax equals the
marginal value that the (national) government attaches to reduced environmen-
tal damage, i.e.  =( , +1 ):&, whereas the capital tax is equal to zero. The
intuition is that the government can use lump-sum taxes to raise revenue, and it
is able to equalize the marginal utility of consumption among consumers (mean-
ing full implementation of the distributional objective implicit in the utilitarian
welfare function). As a consequence, there will be no tax competition for mo-
bile capital. In other words, the only corrective role of taxation that remains
is correction for the environmental externality, which is accomplished by using
the emission tax. In summary, this means that the emission tax is positive (and
equal to the marginal value that the national government attaches to reduced
environmental damage), and the capital tax is zero.
However, this basic intuition does not carry over to an economy with equilib-
rium unemployment, which is seen from equations (19) and (20). The reason is
that the emission and capital taxes will, in this case, also serve as indirect instru-
ments for in uencing the employment. This is seen by the "extra term" in each
tax formula, which is proportional to  . Therefore, these extra terms re ect
an employment-motive for taxation, as a change in either the emission tax or
capital tax a ects the number of employed persons. Although this employment-
motive can lead to either higher or lower taxes in general, one would expect the
extra term in each tax formula to be negative, i.e. that the government tries toDoes Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 11
boost employment by implementing a lower emission tax than would be mo-
tivated by pure domestic externality-correction and subsidizing capital. Note
that this argument also implies that the appearance of equilibrium unemploy-
ment provides an incentive for at the government to compete for mobile capital
(as an increase in the domestic capital stock contributes to increased domestic
employment).
4 Policy Coordination
The uncoordinated equilibrium is globally ine cient for two reasons. The  rst
ine ciency arises because each country implements emission tax policies solely
on the basis of its own domestic objectives, i.e. it does not incorporate into its
decision-problem that the domestic emissions (use of energy) causes environ-
mental damage abroad. The second is due to the international wage bargaining
externality. To see this more clearly, note from equation (10) that the pro t
abroad,  , directly a ects the domestic wage. The larger the outside pro t,
the stronger is the  rm´s bargaining position vis-a-vis the trade union, ceteris
paribus, and the lower will be the wage, i.e.   # 0. However, when each
national government decides upon tax and expenditure policies, it does do not
take into account that the domestic pro t also a ects the fall-back pro t for
 rms in other countries.
We consider policy coordination with respect to the energy and capital tax,
respectively, which are the two corrective tax instruments that each national
government has at its disposal. Since the countries are identical, the point of
departure is a symmetric equilibrium where all countries have chosen the same
tax and expenditure policies. This means that the resource allocation is the
same in all countries; in particular, the capital stock used in the production in
each country is  xed at 7 = ¯ 7 = ,¯ * and the pro ts are equalized, so  =  .
By using the  rst order conditions for the  rm and the  rst order condition for
the wage, where we normalize ? to 0!5 for notational convenience12,w eo b t a i n
the following equation system
12This simpli cation shortens the relevant mathematical expressions. It is not important















  8 (23)
0=9

 ( + <   )>   [9 ( + <   )   9 (= + <)]. (24)
Equations (21)-(24) imply a symmetric equilibrium in the sense that  = ,
 = ,  =  and 8 = 8 become functions of = = =,  = ,  =  and
5 = 5
 (the latter via < = <).
Since the domestic policy has been optimally chosen conditional on the poli-
cies implemented by other countries, a coordinated in nitesimal increase in
either the emission tax or the capital tax a ects welfare only because a policy
change in each country in uences the welfare in other countries (via the two
uninternalized international externalities). Throughout the paper, we assume
that each national governments adjusts the income tax paid by the  rm-owner,
, to maintain budget balance.
Consider  rst the welfare e ect of a coordinated increase in the emission tax
accompanied by an adjustment of the income tax paid by the  rm-owner. With
the other policy instruments held constant, we may then write  as a function
of the domestic and foreign emission taxes, i.e.  =  (). Di erentiating
the Lagrangian in equation (17) w.r.t.  and , and using that  =  in the



















Note that the  rst order e ects on domestic welfare following small changes in 
and  are zero (i.e. L = L =0 ). As a consequence, the only welfare
e ect that remains is due to increased emission taxation abroad, which is seen
from the expression after the second equality. By using a similar argument, the
cost bene t rule for a coordinated increase in the capital tax can be written as
4  =( L5
)45
.
To assess these welfare e ects, consider the following Proposition;
Proposition 1. (i) In the uncoordinated symmetric equilibrium, the welfareDoes Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 13
e ect of a coordinated increase in the emission tax, accompanied by an adjust-
ment of the income tax paid by the  rm-owner to maintain budget balance for
the government in each country, is given by
 
 =  (




































(ii) The analogous cost bene t rule for the capital tax becomes
 
5
 =  (








































Proof: See the Appendix.
Each cost bene t rule contains two parts, which correspond to the respective
externality discussed above. Consider  rst the cost bene t rule for the emission
tax. The  rst part of equation (26) shows that a coordinated in nitesimal in-
crease in the emission tax changes the use of energy in each foreign country by
44.T h e r ea r e (
   1) foreign countries, implying that the total change
in environmental quality due to increased energy taxation abroad is given by
 (
   1)44. Therefore, since there are (, +1 ) domestic consumers,
each of whom experiences a utility change equal to 4:4 , the total welfare
change arising via this mechanism becomes  (
   1)(, +1 )( 4:4)(44).
The intuition behind the  rst part of the cost bene t rule for the capital tax is
analogous.14 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
The second part of each cost bene t rule is due to the international wage
bargaining externality. Note  rst that if the labor market were competitive,
then this component would vanish (as a small change in the wage would have a
zero  rst order welfare e ect). However, in the presence of equilibrium unem-
ployment, an additional (nonzero) welfare e ect arises as a coordinated increase
in the emission tax or capital tax in uences the foreign pro t,  , and, there-
fore, the fall-back pro t facing the domestic  rm during the wage bargain. Since
  constitutes the fall-back pro t for the domestic  rms, the change in   will
in uence the domestic wage, captured by  .
The domestic welfare e ect following a change in the wage, i.e. L in












' + 5'87. (32)
The  rst part of equation (32) is standard: it re ects the direct welfare cost of
a higher wage in terms of lost employment. The second and third parts arise
because  6=( , +1 ):& and 5 6=0 , since imperfect competition in the labor
market means that the emission and capital tax policies governing the uncoordi-
nated equilibrium typically deviate from the policies that would be implemented
if the labor markets were competitive.13 As we argued above, although these
components can be either positive or negative in general, intuition suggests that
the tax policy in the uncoordinated equilibrium satis es #(, +1 ):& and
5#0, in which case the second and third terms in equation (32) tend to reduce
the welfare cost of an increase in the wage. In other words, even if we were to
base our interpretations on the assumption that L # 0 (which appears to
be reasonable in an economy with unemployment), the preexisting emission tax
and capital tax policies may, nevertheless, o set part of the welfare gain that
would otherwise arise from a decrease in the wage and, therefore, also reduce
the absolute value of the second part of each cost bene t rule in the proposition.
Although the uncoordinated equilibrium is suboptimal from the perspective
13With competitive labor markets, where     in each country, the uncoordinated equi-
librium would support a "national  rst best policy" in the sense that
 =(  +1 )	 and  =0
i nw h i c hc a s et h es e c o n da n dt h i r dt e r m so nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 3 2 )w o u l db e
equal to zero.Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 15
of society as a whole, we cannot sign the cost bene t rules in Proposition 1
without further assumptions. However, what we can say is that if 44
and 4 4 have opposite signs - and if L # 0 -t h e n  is signed,
in which case it is possible to make a coordinated change of the emission tax
such that welfare increases in all countries. If, on the other hand, 44 and
4 4 h a v et h es a m es i g n ,t h e n  is not signed. The condition under
which the cost bene t rule for the capital tax can be signed is analogous.
4.1 A More Speci c Model
To go further, we consider the special case of the model, where the utility func-
tion is quasi-linear and the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type. The
utility facing an employed and unemployed worker, respectively, then becomes
9 =  + <    + :() (33)
9 = = + < + :(). (34)
The production function is given by
 (7)=1723 (35)
where 0 #$ 1$ 2$ 3 and $1 +$2 +$3 # 1. We begin by analyzing a coordinated
increase in the emission tax and then continue with a coordinated increase in the
capital tax. Throughout this section, our discussion is based on the assumption
that L # 0.
4.1.1 A Coordinated Change in the Emission Tax
Before using the utility and production functions in equations (33)-(35) to eval-
uate the cost bene t rule for the emission tax, we start by examining how a
change in the emission tax abroad a ects the environmental damage and pro t
abroad, i.e. the derivatives 44 and 4 4. It turns out that the signs
of these derivatives depend on the component ( + =), which we will refer
to as the "net tax revenue-wage ratio". Consider Lemma 1.16 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
Lemma 1.
(i) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es (+=) # $1, then 44 # 0
and 4 4 + 0.
(ii) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es $1 # (  + =) # $1(1   $3),
then 44 + 0 and 4 4 + 0.
(iii) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es $1(1   $3) # ( + =), then
44 # 0 and 4 4 # 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
To interpret Lemma 1, we  rst need to evaluate how the wage rate responds
to a coordinated increase in the emission tax. Di erentiating equation system
(21) - (24) w.r.t.  = ,w eo b t a i n

 =




 =[ (  + =)(1  $3)   $1]$317232.
Equation (36) implies that the wage response is negative if ( + =) #
$1(1   $3). In this case, therefore, a coordinated increase in the emission tax
leads to a lower wage. This means that the  rms have the opportunity to substi-
tute energy for labor in the production. Since relatively more labor will now be
used in the production (at a lower cost than before the policy reform), there is
room for an increase in the pro t, which is what happens with a Cobb-Douglas
production function. This explains part (i) of the lemma. Part (ii) is basically
an extension of the argument underlying part (i) in the sense that, if the wage
decreases in response to increased emission taxation, this wage reduction may
be so large that the demand for energy actually increases. This happens if the
net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es $1   (  + =) # $1(1   $3). Finally,
part (iii) corresponds to the case where the wage response is positive, which
happens when $1(1   $3) # ( + =). As a consequence, both the use of
energy in production and the pro t will decrease.
Let us then turn to the implications in terms of the cost bene t rule for the
emission tax. We have derived the following result;Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 17
Proposition 2. Suppose that the economy has reached the uncoordinated sym-
metric equilibrium, that the consumers have a quasi-linear utility function, and
that the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type. Consider the cost bene t
rule for a coordinated increase in the emission tax in Proposition 1.
(i) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es ( + =) # $1, a coordinated
increase in the emission alleviates the preexisting environmental externality and
the preexisting international wage bargaining externality. This leads to higher
welfare.
(ii) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es $1 # ( +=) # $1(1 $3), a
coordinated increase in the emission reinforces the preexisting environmental ex-
ternality and alleviates the preexisting international wage bargaining externality.
This renders the welfare e ect ambiguous in sign.
(iii) If the net tax revenue-wage ratio satis es $1(1   $3) # ( + =), ac o -
ordinated increase in the emission tax alleviates the preexisting environmental
externality and reinforces the preexisting international wage bargaining exter-
nality. This renders the welfare e ect ambiguous in sign.
Proposition 2 shows that the international wage bargaining externality may sig-
ni cantly in uence the welfare e ects of a coordinated increase in the emission
tax. Part (i) of the proposition means that the welfare e ect is unambiguously
positive if the net tax revenue,  + =, is relatively small by comparison with
the gross wage, . In this case, therefore, the results are interpretable in terms
of a ”double dividend” of a coordinated increase in the emission tax, as such a
reform alleviates both the environmental externality and the wage bargaining
externality. Part (ii) implies that the higher emission tax induces the union to
make large concessions in the wage bargain. In fact, the wage will be reduced
so much that it causes an increase in the use of energy (as labor and energy are
complements in terms of the production function). This means that the pre-
existing environmental externality is actually reinforced, although the reform
contributes to alleviate the wage bargaining externality. Finally, part (iii) shows
that if the net tax revenue is large enough relative to the gross wage, both the
use of energy and the pro t will decrease. The intuition is that a coordinated
increase in the emission tax leads to a higher wage. Therefore, although the18 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
reform contributes to alleviate the preexisting environmental externality, the
preexisting wage bargaining externality becomes reinforced, which renders the
welfare e ect ambiguous.
In most real world economies, the net tax revenue-wage ratio is likely to
satisfy the inequality in part (iii) of Proposition 2. The argument above then
implies that the welfare e ect of a coordinated environmental policy reform may
not be so large (and it may even be negative).
4.1.2 A Coordinated Change of the Capital Income Tax
Let us now use the quasi-linear utility function and Cobb-Douglas production
function to evaluate the cost bene t rule for the capital tax in Proposition 1.
Consider the following result;
Proposition 3. Suppose that the economy has reached the uncoordinated sym-
metric equilibrium, that the consumers have a quasi-linear utility function, and
that the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type. It follows that a coordi-
nated increase in the capital tax, while the income tax paid by the  rm-owner is
adjusted to maintain budget balance for the government in each country, leaves
welfare una ected (as a  rst order approximation).
This result appears because the consumers have a quasi-linear utility function, in
which case 5 drops out from the  rst order condition for the wage. A coordinated
change in 5 will in this case neither a ect the wage nor the allocation of capital
between countries. As a consequence, the use of energy and the pro t also
remain una ected, meaning that both parts of equation (29) are zero.
5 Summary
This paper analyzes the welfare e ects of policy reforms designed to introduce
coordination among countries. An uncoordinated equilibrium, where each coun-
try implements tax policy based solely on its own objectives and constraints,
constitutes the reference case. We assume that the set of tax instruments fac-
ing the government in each country consists of an emission tax and a capital
tax. The environmental damage is transboundary. In addition,  rms and trade-
unions bargain over the wage, which creates an ine cient labor market outcomeDoes Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 19
in the sense of equilibrium unemployment. The countries interact both via the
transboundary externality and via the wage formation system. The latter inter-
action arises because the fall-back pro t facing domestic  rms during the wage
bargain is the pro t they can obtain if they move production abroad minus the
cost associated with such a move. This creates an international wage bargaining
externality.
We begin by characterizing the emission tax and capital tax policies in a
noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Although the e ects on the tax structure of
imperfect competition in the labor market is ambiguous in general, we argue
that each country is likely to implement lower taxes on emissions and capital
than they would have done had the labor market been competitive.
Two policy reforms are then designed. First, a coordinated increase in the
emission tax and, second, a coordinated increase in the capital tax. In both
cases, a nondistortionary pro t tax is adjusted to maintain budget balance
for the government. Having characterized the cost bene t rule for each such
reform, we consider a special case with a quasi-linear utility function and a
Cobb-Douglas production function and show that the  rst reform is welfare
improving if the ratio of the net tax revenue and the wage is smaller than
the output elasticity of labor. If, on the other hand, the ratio of the net tax
revenue and the wage is larger than the output elasticity of labor, the welfare
e ect is ambiguous. Therefore, even if a coordinated increase in the emission
tax (most likely) alleviates the environmental externality, it may reinforce the
international wage bargaining externality. We also show that, if the consumers
have a quasi-linear utility function and the production function is of Cobb-
Douglas type, the welfare e ect of a coordinated increase in the capital tax is
zero.20 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
6 Appendix
The government’s  rst order conditions are
L
=
=( ,   )(9
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Combining (A.3), (A.4) and (A.6) and solving for  gives
 =( , +1 )
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Finally, combining equations (A.10) and (A.11), we obtain the tax formulas
given by equations (19) and (20).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Di erentiating the Lagrangian w.r.t.  produces
L
 =  (














































By combining equation (A.12) with equations (A.1), (A.3), (A.5) and (A.9),
and using that 7 = ,¯ * = ¯ * +( ,   )¯ * in the symmetric equilibrium, we
can write the resulting expression as
L
 =  (





































If we use the comparative statics derivatives in equations (11) - (13), one can
see that the sum of the partial derivatives of the bargained wage inside the  rst
parenthesis in the second row of equation (A.13) sum to zero, in which case we
obtain equation (26). The derivation of equation (29) is analogous.
Proof of Lemma 1
To begin with, we need to evaluate 44. Di erentiating equation system
(21) - (24) w.r.t.  = ,w eo b t a i n
4
4 =  
( + =)   $1
 
(A.14)
where22 Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental...
 =[ (  + =)(1  $3)   $1]$317232. (A.15)
By inspection, it follows that 44 # 0 when ( + =) # $1, 44 + 0
when $1   ( + =) # $1(1   $3) and 44 # 0 when $1(1   $3) #
( + =).
To evaluate 4 4, we  rst need to evaluate 44 and 484. Di er-
entiating equation system (21) - (24) w.r.t.  = ,w eo b t a i n

 =








Substituting equations (A.16) and (A.17) into equation (27), using   =
  and that the production function is given by (35), we have
4 
4 =  
(1   $1   $2   $3)$3
 
17231 ( + =) (A.18)
By inspection, it follows that   + 0 when ( + =) # $1(1   $3) and
  # 0 when ( + =) + $1(1   $3).Does Wage Bargaining Justify Environmental... 23
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for pol-
icy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and interna-
tional environmental policies. International environmental policies are
characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two
countries and it is found, among other things, that the presence of lo-
cal lobbying tends to reduce the level of pollution taxes. Furthermore,
an increase in the environmental concern - here de ned as an increase in
the number of environmentalists - may reduce the pollution tax in both
countries. It is also possible that increased environmental concern in one
country reduces the pollution tax in the other country.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When individuals are a ected by political decisions, they have an incentive to
try to in uence the political outcome. One way of doing so is to participate in
lobby groups, which exercise pressure on the incumbent governments. For ex-
ample, ’green’ lobby groups may exercise political pressure to increase pollution
taxes, while industry lobby groups may try to reduce costs that are associated
with pollution. The number of lobby groups and the extent to which they af-
fect the political outcome may di er both between countries and over time.1
Earlier literature on green lobbying and environmental policy has mainly fo-
cused on policies decided upon at the national level. Therefore, this paper
analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies
with transboundary environmental problems and international environmental
policies are analyzed.
Previous studies suggest that green lobbying leads to a stricter environmen-
tal policy at the national level. For example, Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998)
show that more green lobbying may lead to higher pollution taxes in small open
economies with local pollution.2 Furthermore, Conconi (2003) introduces in-
teractions between countries, such as trade and transboundary pollution, and
examines how green lobbying a ects policy outcomes. She shows that the im-
pact of green lobbying depends crucially on the trade regime and on how lobby
groups act together. A speci c result is that one country’s increase in pollution
taxes, triggered by lobbying, improves the terms of trade in favor of the other
country, which leads to an increase in that country’s production and emissions.
However, it is worth noting that Conconi (2003) does not consider consequences
of environmental policies that are determined in a negotiation between coun-
tries, which will be the case in this paper. Moreover, Aidt (2005)  nds that
an increase in the in uence from environmental lobby-groups may lead to lower
pollution taxes. This result rests on the assumption that pollution is immo-
bile and environmentalists care su ciently about pollution that arises abroad.
Speci cally, when environmentalists are very concerned with pollution abroad,
the lobby group is willing to accept more domestic pollution in return for less
1See e.g. Conconi (2003) for a discussion on the importance of lobbying in real world
politics.
2Fredriksson (1997) uses a lobby group model to study how a pollution tax is a ected by
m o v e m e n t si np r i c e sa n dl o b b y i n g .2 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
pollution abroad. Accordingly, these two studies show that the standard in-
tuition, where stronger environmental lobby groups improve the environmental
quality, may not necessarily be correct.
In this paper, the standard lobby group model in Fredriksson (1997) is ex-
tended to include a negotiation between countries with respect to environmental
policy, here de ned as pollution taxes.3 Hence, the present paper does not fo-
cus on trade policies but instead on international environmental agreements.
The present paper considers a global economy consisting of many small coun-
tries but, to simplify the analysis as much as possible, it is assumed that only
two of them generate, and are a ected by, transboundary pollution. These
two countries coordinate their environmental policies (taxes) via a cooperative
Nash bargain, while treating the world market prices as exogenous. Although
the focus on a two-country agreement is a simpli cation and motivated by con-
venience, the model is interpretable in terms of the literature on ’bottom-up’
agreements; see e.g. Buchner and Carraro (2005).4
The purpose of this paper is to bring together lobbying, transboundary en-
vironmental problems and international environmental policy. It follows earlier
literature on lobbying and employs a standard menu auction model  rst applied
in Grossman and Helpman (1994).5 The menu auction model is a suitable tool
for analyzing situations where di erent lobby groups o er an incumbent gov-
ernment a menu of campaign contributions in return for a particular choice of
policy. It should perhaps be emphasized that lobby activities are assumed to
3It can perhaps be argued that a negotiation over national policy instruments directly is
an unrealistic assumption. However, this can - for example - be seen in economic federations
such as the European Union. In such federations carbon dioxide targets are determined at
the federal level although each member country choses how to implement the targets. As
for the present paper, the negotiation over national pollution taxes becomes equivalent to a
negotiation over national target levels.
4With a bottom-up approach, each country has the freedom to sign agreements with other
countries, bilaterally or multilaterally, without being constrained by a ’global’ convention (by
’global’ it is referred to e.g. the Kyoto protocol and other international agreements). The
bottom-up approach most likely lead to more regional coalitions with stronger incentives to
participate (see Buchner and Carraro (2005) for a more rigorous discussion of this topic).
If some countries do not take part in the agreement but are a ected by the transboundary
pollution, the approach does not completely internalize the external e ects. However, an
assumption of all countries taking part in the agreement is not su cient to guarantee a
complete internalization.
5The model in Grossman and Helpman (1994) originates from a paper by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986).Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 3
be strictly national, meaning that campaign contributions are o ered to the do-
mestic government6, and depend on domestic government policies7. Hence, the
possibility of ‘cross-national’ lobbying is disregarded in this paper. Furthermore,
each government is assumed to care only about the probability of re-election,
which depends on a weighted sum of aggregate campaign contributions and
domestic social welfare.
The negotiation between the countries is characterized as a Nash bargain
with two possible outcomes facing each government. The preferred outcome to
both governments is a signed contract that, by de nition, renders a higher level
of welfare than the no-contract outcome. If no contract is signed, each govern-
ment obtains the ‘fall-back’ welfare level, which represents a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, where each government treats the policy instruments of the
other country as exogenous. Since each country bene ts from signing a contract,
the Nash bargain approach may be interpreted in terms of a ‘self-enforcing’
agreement.8 Moreover, it is also worth noting that, if the political process is
considered as a repeated game, the bottom-up approach may increase the cred-
ibility of the contract because a country could face a punishment in the next
round of negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its
characteristics. Section 3 de nes and explains the political process. The main
results are presented in section 4, while section 5 summarizes and discusses the
results.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy consisting of many small countries. Two of these
countries, denoted by superindices 1 and 2, respectively, are identical in all
important respects. Pollution in each of these two countries is assumed to a ect
6There are studies where lobby groups in one country may o er contributions to the gov-
ernment in the other country; see e.g. Prat and Rustichini (2003) for the multiple agent -
multiple principle approach. This approach is adopted by Fredriksson and Millimet (2007)
who study pollution taxation, and by Aidt and Hwang (2008) who study internalization of
’cross national’ externalities via labour standards.
7Grossman and Helpman (1995) extend their previous paper to allow for contribution
schedules that are contingent on tax policies in both countries.
8There is an existing body of literature that deals with game theoretic aspects of policy
cooperation, see e.g. Mäler (1989), Barrett (1994) and Carraro (2003).4 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
not only the domestic residents, but also residents in the other country. Notice,
however, that pollution is assumed to be transboundary only in a restricted
way, as no other country is a ected by the environmental damage generated by
these two particular countries.9
Production in country ,  =1 2, takes place in two sectors; one produces a
non-polluting good, , that serves as a numeraire, while the other produces a
polluting good, . Both countries produce both types of goods. The numeraire
good is produced with a linear technology that uses labor as the only input,
whereas good  is produced with a constant returns to scale technology that
uses labor and a sector-speci c input in the production. The sector-speci c
input is assumed to be immobile and non-tradable. Furthermore, all markets
are assumed to be competitive and the wage rate is normalized to one in both
countries.
The government in country  has the possibility to levy a tax on the pollu-
tion associated with the production of good . Free trade and the assumption
of small open economies de ne the producer price of good  as @ = @   ,
where @ is the world market consumer price on good  and  the corre-
sponding pollution tax paid by the producers. The assumption of price taking
economies implies that @ is exogenous to each country/government. The rev-
enue from the pollution tax in country  is given by  =  and is redistributed
uniformly to all individuals.10 Pro t maximization de nes a pro t function,
 (@), and a supply function11, 
 (@), where the latter satis es 




@¢2 =0 . Hotelling’s lemma de nes the supply of good  as

 (@)= @ (1)
Each country consists of ) citizens who receive labor income, , and, for
notational convenience, ) is normalized to one. Some citizens are assumed to
have a special interest in the environmental quality, while others receive pro t
9It is, of course, possible to generalize the model to include more than two countries that
are a ected by environmental damage. However, given the objective of this paper it would
complicate the analysis without providing any valuable insights (at least in the symmetric
equilibrium, which is the main focus of the paper).
10The assumption of uniformly distributed revenues follows related literature, see e.g. Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997).
11A linear supply function is used for computational reasons and follows Fredriksson (1997).
An example of a production technology that implies a linear supply function is a Cobb-Douglas
production function with an input elasticity equal to 0.5.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 5
income from the production of . The remaining agents (i.e. those who are
neither environmentalists nor owners of the  rm that produces ) are called
workers. In what follows, these groups are denoted environmentalists, industri-
alists and workers, respectively (superindex ,  and  ). By assumption, all
citizens share a common quasilinear utility function for  and ,w h e r e a se n v i -
ronmentalists also derive disutility from pollution associated with the produc-
tion of good .12 Hence, workers and industrialists have their utility functions
de ned as
! = ! + 9(!) (2)
 =  + 9() (3)
while an environmentalist’s utility becomes
 =  + 9()   	 (4)
where 	 is the disutility experienced from both domestic and foreign pollution,
de ned as 	 =  +  for  6= .N o t i c et h a t, * =  , is the fraction
of  associated with each group of individuals and that the marginal disutility
of pollution is normalized to one. It is assumed that all citizens receive income
from both labor and redistributed tax revenues, while industrialists also receive
pro t income from the polluting sector.
Citizens with interests in the polluting sector are assumed to organize them-
selves into lobby groups. Environmentalists join the environmental lobby group
and industrialists join the industry lobby group, while workers do not take part
in any lobbying. Lobby group membership is exogenous in the model, meaning
that all environmentalists and all industrialists are assumed to be members in
their respective groups.13
Citizens use their income to  nance the consumption of  and .H o w e v e r ,
environmentalists and industrialists also support their interests by campaign
contributions to the incumbent government. Campaign contributions in each
country are assumed to depend only on the domestic pollution tax rate, i.e.
 () and  (). Other characteristics of the contribution schedules are
12The quasilinear utility function is appealing because it implies a simple demand structure
and there are no income e ects to be considered. A quasilinear utility function is also in line
with related literature as e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994).
13For a more general discussion of incentives associated with lobbying, see e.g. Olson (1965).6 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
discussed in more detail later in the paper. It is assumed that the environ-
mentalists recognize that a higher tax on pollution reduces production in the
polluting sector, while industrialists recognize that a higher tax on pollution
reduces pro ts. Given these characteristics, each citizen chooses  and  to
maximize his/her utility subject to the budget constraint. The optimization
problem facing environmentalists and industrialists can be written as
max









 =  + 9() (6)
A!!  +  +  - =  + @ +  -,
respectively, where - and - are the fractions of environmentalists and
industrialists, respectively, in country . As described above, workers are not
lobby group members and do not give any campaign contributions. Hence, the
optimization problem facing each worker is written as
max

 ! = ! + 9(!) (7)
A!!  +  =  + @!
By de ning B  as each individual’s net income after redistributed tax rev-
enues (), pro ts ( ) and expenses for lobbying ( ), the indirect utility
functions for each type of individual can be written as
 (@ B)=B  + 9(

" (@))   @

" (@)   	
 (@ B)=B  + 9(

" (@))   @

" (@) (8)
 !(@ B!)=B ! + 9(
!
" (@))   @
!
" (@)
where the demand for the polluting good, associated with each type of in-
dividual, 

" (@),i st h ei n v e r s eo f9() = @ and the di erence
9(

" (@))   @

" (@) is the consumer surplus derived from the two goods.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 7
Each lobby group’s utility is de ned as the sum of its members’ utilities.
Hence, when omitting constant terms and in the absence of campaign contri-








 ()=-()+  (@)
By adding all indirect utilities, the aggregate social welfare function in country
 is de ned as




3T h e P o l i t i c a l G a m e
As mentioned in the introduction, the political process to determine the level of
pollution taxes can be described as a two stage game. The  rst takes place at the
national level between the government and the lobby groups, where each lobby
group o ers the incumbent government a contribution schedule that depends
on the pollution tax rate, i.e.  (), * = . The contribution schedule
from each lobby group is assumed to be continuously di erentiable and each
lobby group treats the other lobby group’s contribution schedule as exogenous.
Following earlier literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994)), possible ef-
fects of direct political competition (political parties) and lobby groups that do
not recognize that their contributions a ect the likelihood of re-election of the
incumbent government are disregarded.
In line with earlier comparable literature, it is assumed that the incumbent
government uses contributions to  nance campaign spending. The incumbent
government realizes the relationship between campaign spending and the prob-
ability of re-election, and that the probability of re-election also depends on
the aggregate welfare of society. Therefore, given that re-election is the single
goal of the government, the incumbent government in each country maximizes a
weighted sum of aggregate campaign contributions and aggregate social welfare.





 ( ) (11)8 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
where %
   0 is an exogenous weight attached to aggregate social welfare relative
to campaign contributions.14
In the second stage, where the bargain between the two governments takes
place, each government takes the contribution schedules into consideration and
negotiates with the other country’s government about the policy. Let   =
 ( ) be the welfare each government obtains if it signs a contract, and
 

the welfare obtained if no contract is signed (denoted ‘fall-back’). The fall-
back outcome is derived by assuming that each government behaves as a Nash
competitor by choosing its policy conditional on the other country’s policy, i.e.
the outcome will be a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. By de ning   =
   

and   =     

to be the rents from bargaining, the Nash bargain
maximizes the product
 =    (12)
with respect to  and  (where both governments are assumed to have equal





   +
 
   =0 (13)
3.1 The equilibrium
It is assumed that the environmental policy and the campaign contributions
are determined as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game presented
above. The characteristics of this subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that
each contribution schedule is feasible, that the chosen pollution taxes maximize
the government’s objective function and, given the contribution schedules of
each lobby group, no other lobby group has an alternative strategy that yields
a greater payo  than the equilibrium payo . These characteristics follow the
equilibrium properties derived in Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit (1996)
and Fredriksson (1997), which are all based on the characterization of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in a menu auction model developed in Bernheim and
14Following the model as de ned above, the government’s problem should be introduced as a














. However, this is equivalent




1   
2
	
, given that the government values
a dollar in their campaign budget higher than a dollar in the hands of the public, i.e. given
that 
1  
2. This assumption is in line with related literature and must hold when lobbying
exists.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 9
Whinston (1986). These equilibrium properties imply, among other things, that
 () =  ( ) for * =  (14)
The intuition behind this property is that each lobby group sets its contribution
schedule so that the change in the contributions, caused by a marginal change in
the tax rate, is equal to the corresponding change in the lobby group’s welfare.
Hence, the property corresponds to the marginal willingness to pay for a change
in the tax rate. The contribution schedules are said to be locally truthful around
the equilibrium pollution tax rate.15 Throughout the paper, this equilibrium
property is assumed to hold, meaning that equation (14) will be interpreted as
a constraint in the optimization process.
4 The Environmental Policy Outcome
The main purpose of this section is to derive optimal pollution taxes and to
study how exogenous changes in the number of lobby group members, as well
as changes in the relative weight the government attaches to social welfare, a ect
the policy outcome. To simplify the analysis, the section begins with a bench-
mark case in which the policy is determined without any in uence of lobbying.
It then continues by incorporating lobbying into a symmetric framework where
the countries are identical in all important respects, and changes are symmetric
between the countries. Finally, the pollution taxes are derived and analyzed
with di erences between the two countries, meaning that the assumption of
identical countries is relaxed.
Within the lobby group framework, a standard result when all individu-
als have their interests represented by lobby groups is that the policy outcome
becomes socially e cient and replicates the  rst best. This result is a direct
implication of an e cient equilibrium as presented in Bernheim and Winston
(1986). The intuition is simply that the externality becomes completely inter-
nalized in this case. However given the speci c setup of this paper, the exter-
nality is not completely internalized - even though all individuals have their
interests represented by lobby groups (this is explained in more detail below).
Accordingly, to simplify the analysis as much as possible, most of the results
15See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a more rigorous discussion about this property.10 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
are presented with the assumption that all citizens are lobby group members
(i.e. either environmentalists or industrialists).
4.1 The benchmark case
In the absence of lobbying, the objective of each national government reduces
to the measure of aggregate social welfare. By using   = %
 ,i ne q u a t i o n
(12), the optimal solution de nes the pollution tax in country  as
 = - + - (15)
where it is used that   =   in a symmetric equilibrium with identical coun-
tries16.
This result is standard and implies that the optimal pollution tax in each
country equals the sum of marginal social damage that this country generates.
Given the model speci cation, the sum of marginal social damage is de ned as
the proportion of environmentalists in both countries.17
4.2 The symmetric equilibrium
The introduction of lobbying implies that each government maximizes the ob-
jective function de ned by equation (11). Consider the case where all citizens
are either environmentalists or industrialists, i.e. - + - =1 .
Proposition 1 Within the given framework, a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium with symmetric countries implies that the pollution taxes are de ned as





where - = -%
 = %
 and  6= .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Compared with equation (15), the pollution tax in country  is lower than
in the benchmark case. The intuition is that a government only receives con-
tributions from domestic lobby groups and, therefore, attaches no weight to
16Without the assumption of identical countries, the pollution tax in country  equals





17This result corresponds to a tax rate equal to the sum of marginal willingness to pay to
avoid the pollution, i.e.  =

 , in related literature. A Benthamite approach, where
a global planner determines the pollution taxes in both countries, also gives the same result.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 11
the other country’s environmentalists. The pollution tax re ects the weight
the other country’s government attaches to social welfare. The interpretation
must be that the marginal social damage from pollution in country  has less
impact on the pollution tax in country . Accordingly, the introduction of lob-
bying implies that the pollution tax in country  is de ned as a weighted sum of
the marginal social damage in each country, and pollution taxes become lower
with lobbying than without (i.e., the benchmark case). This result implies that
although all citizens have their interests represented by lobby groups, the pol-
lution tax does not replicate  rst best; the policy outcome does not completely
internalize the externality.
4.2.1 Comparative statics in a symmetric equilibrium
It is reasonable to assume that the environmental concern and industrial lobby-
ing may change within countries. It is also reasonable to assume that the weight
the government attaches to lobbying may change. It is, for example, possible
that a government’s motive may change over time, which is interpreted as a
change in the weight attached to contributions. Therefore, a relevant question
would be to ask how the equilibrium pollution taxes are a ected by changes in
- and %
?
Given that all citizens are either environmentalist or industrialists, it is suf-
 cient to study changes in only one lobby group’s member base, since the e ect
of the other lobby group becomes its mirror image. Moreover, to characterize
a general change in either the environmental concern, or in the weight the gov-
ernments attach to social welfare, in the two countries, it will be convenient to
de ne - = - + - and % = %
 + %
 . Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a symmetric equilibrium, a general increase in the environ-
mental concern or in the weight the governments attach to social welfare will
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To prove Proposition 2, di erentiate the pollution tax equation derived in
Proposition 1 and solve for 44- and 44%, respectively.
First, consider the general increase in the environmental concern (de ned as
more environmentalists in both countries). In Proposition 1, the pollution tax
was de ned as a weighted sum of marginal social damages in countries  and
. Hence, an increase in the number of environmentalists in both countries will
undoubtedly increase this weighted sum. The reason is that more individuals
in each country are negatively a ected by pollution, and thus accept/want a
higher tax on pollution.
To interpret the e ect on  of increasing the weight attached to social wel-
f a r e ,n o t et h a taj o i n ti n c r e a s ei n%
 and %
 a ects the pollution tax in country
 via the preferences of country ’s environmentalists. When di erentiating the
pollution tax in Proposition 1 with respect to both %
 and %
, it becomes obvious
that an increase in %
 tends to decrease the weight attached to the preferences
in country , while an increase in %
 tends to increase this weight. Hence, the
joint increase in %
 and %
 has both a positive and negative e ect on the tax
rate in country . However, since the government in country  now attaches
relatively less weight on lobbying contributions compared to social welfare, the
net e ect becomes positive. The government in country  attaches relatively
more weight on the preferences of the environmentalists in country .N o t i c e
that, as contributions become less important to the government, the pollution
tax approaches the benchmark case. In the limit, when %
 goes to in nity,
the contributions becomes insigni cant and aggregate social welfare is all that
matters to the government.
4.3 Extensions
Although the assumption of symmetric countries gives intuitive results, it is
partly motivated by analytical convenience. Allowing for asymmetries between
the countries takes the analysis one step further. For example, the introduction
of asymmetries makes it possible to analyze pollution taxes when countries dif-
fer with respect to their environmental concern (number of environmentalists),
which certainly is a realistic scenario. As for the symmetric equilibrium, con-
sider the case where all citizens are lobby group members, i.e. - + - =1 .
Proposition 3 Within the given framework, a subgame perfect Nash equilib-Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 13
rium with asymmetric countries implies pollution taxes de ned by







Proof. See the Appendix.
When the analysis is extended to allow for asymmetries, the tax rates change
slightly. Compared with the symmetric equilibrium, the second part of the
pollution tax equation is now multiplied by the quotient of rents (  ). If
the two countries are not identical, these rents may di er and the quotient
may, therefore, deviate from unity. For example, countries may di er with
respect to the proportion of environmentalists and/or industrialists as well as
the weight that the government attaches to social welfare. Assume for a moment
an exogenous change that only a ects country  and increases the rent  .I n
such a case (cet. par.), the quotient of rents becomes larger than one and
thus works in the direction of increasing the pollution tax in country .T h e
interpretation is that country  becomes more eager to reach an agreement (has
more to lose from a no-contract outcome or, alternatively, puts less pressure on
country ) and, therefore, accepts a higher tax on pollution.
To conclude, the introduction of asymmetries between the two countries may
either increase or decrease the pollution taxes, compared to the symmetric case,
depending on the relative rents.
4.3.1 Symmetric changes in an asymmetric equilibrium
From Proposition 3 it is obvious that, to analyze changes in the number of en-
vironmentalists and the weight attached to social welfare, e ects via the rents,
 , need to be considered. This, however, implies a slightly more complicated
analysis since changes in exogenous variables in one country a ect the other
country’s policy decision via the quotient of rents. Recall that, the assump-
tion of symmetric countries actually implies that symmetric changes in both
countries have equal e ects on the rents - the rent e ects become insigni cant.
Accordingly, the comparative statics in an asymmetric equilibrium must be
solved as a simultaneous system of equations (tax equations), where exogenous
changes may also a ect the fall-back outcome.
Given an asymmetric equilibrium, the total e ect on the pollution taxes
from an increase in the fraction of environmentalists in both countries becomes14 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
ambiguous. To see this, take as a starting point the pollution taxes de ned in
Proposition 3. By inspection, there are now e ects via the quotient of rents,
in addition to the positive e ects derived in Proposition 2. These rent e ects
capture how a change in the number of environmentalists a ects a country’s
incentives in the bargaining process (as described above). The total e ect be-
comes ambiguous since the rents in each country,   and  , are a ected so
that they tend to increase, as well as decrease, the pollution tax. For instance,
one of the rent e ects (via  ) captures how an increase in the number of en-
vironmentalists in country  tends to decrease the pollution tax in country 
since the rent   increases. The interpretation of this particular e ect is that
country  becomes more eager to reach an agreement when - increases, and
relaxes the pressure on country  in the bargaining process.
To conclude, given symmetric countries a general increase in the environ-
mental concern increases the pollution tax. However, when allowing for asym-
metries, the possibility that a general increase in environmental concern actually
reduces the pollution tax cannot be excluded.
4.3.2 Asymmetric changes in a symmetric equilibrium
To develop the analysis further, it would be interesting to study the e ects on
the pollution taxes when the number of environmentalists changes in only one
country. Therefore, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Starting with identical countries, an increase in the number of
environmentalists in country  (-) increases the pollution tax in that country
(), while it has an ambiguous e ect on the other country’s pollution tax ().
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the environmental concern increases in one country, it is natural that
it a ects the domestic pollution tax, but, through the bargaining, it must also
be taken into account that it a ects the pollution tax in the other country. Be-
sides the positive e ects derived in the case with symmetric changes, there is
now an e ect via the rent in country .S i n c e - + 0, this accentuates
the positive impact on the tax rate. The intuition follows the previously dis-
cussed rent e ects, which implies that country  becomes more eager to reach
an agreement and hence increases its pollution tax.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 15
The total ’cross-country’ e ect from an increase in - is indeterminate
because, in addition to the e ects that tend to increase  (corresponding to the
e ects in Proposition 2), there is a negative e ect that tends to decrease the
pollution tax . The intuition behind this negative e ect is that the increase
in -, and the corresponding reduction of pressure that country  puts on
country  in the bargaining process, implies that country  tends to reduce
its pollution tax. The government in country  becomes more eager to reach
an agreement when the number of environmentalists increases, and therefore
reduces its pressure on the other country. Therefore, if this e ect is large enough
an increase in the environmental concern in country  may actually reduce the
pollution tax in country .
The exogenous change in the fraction of environmentalists a ects the welfare
in both the bargaining outcome and the fall-back outcome. This implies that
the assumption of the fall-back welfare is crucial for Proposition 4. So far in the
paper, it has been assumed that the fall-back welfare may be a ected by exoge-
nous changes in country characteristics. However, let us change the setup for a
moment and make an assumption of a  xed fall-back welfare. This could, for
example, be the case if a supranational organization decides the environmental
policy if no contract is signed. In such a case,  - becomes negative and
turns the rent e ects discussed in Proposition 4 in the opposite direction. The
intuition is that, since more individuals are negatively a ected by pollution, the
increased number of environmentalists decreases the aggregate social welfare
cet.par. which decreases the rent. Recall the case of a ’ exible’ fall-back wel-
fare in which more environmentalists reduced the aggregate social welfare to a
larger extent in the fall-back case, implying a positive e ect on the rent. Hence,
an increase in one country’s environmental concern has a corresponding impact
on the tax rates as in the  exible ’fall-back’ case, yet with completely opposite
’rent e ects’. These opposite rent e ects imply that the ’cross country’ e ect
is now unambiguously positive, while the ’home country’ e ect is ambiguous.
The intuition behind these results is analogous to Proposition 4.
4.4 Pollution taxes with workers included
Although the assumption of - + - =1implies pollution taxes that dif-
fer from the  rst best, it is reasonable to assume that some citizens are not




# 1 (as de ned in section 2.1).18 However,
note that di erences between countries are still allowed for, i.e. an asymmetric






















is the tax elasticity of total pollution in country
. By inspection, it can be found that (
 + 0 if total pollution is decreasing
in the tax rate, i.e. if C
 # 0,a n di f- + - # 1.T h i s s h o w s t h a t , g i v e n
an asymmetric equilibrium where lobby groups employ campaign contributions
that ful l the criterion for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and if pollution
taxes are determined in a Nash bargain between two countries, the outcome will
be tax rates de ned as
 =
"










Therefore, the pollution tax in country  depends on lobby group member-
ship, the governments’ weights attached to aggregate social welfare and the tax
elasticity of pollution in country . Moreover, the pollution taxes are unam-
biguously positive in equilibrium, given that total pollution is decreasing in the
tax rate, i.e. the tax elasticity of pollution is negative. When compared to the
pollution tax derived in Proposition 3, it becomes obvious that the previously
derived tax formula now is multiplied by (
. Hence, an increase in (
 tends to
increase the tax rates and vice versa. This means that the pollution tax now
depends on the tax elasticity of pollution, C
. Di erentiation of equation (16)
gives that (
 is decreasing in C
, which implies that the tax rate tends to in-
crease (via (
) the more sensitive pollution is to changes in the tax rate (C
 more
negative). The intuition behind this result is that, although the positive welfare
e ect to environmentalists increases, the negative tax revenue e ect through
the lost tax base dominates and hence tends to decrease the tax rate.
Finally, it is worth noting that the only di erence compared with the tax
rates derived in Proposition 3 is that not all citizens are lobby group members.
Accordingly, when the number of lobby group members increases, the pollution
tax approaches that in Proposition 3. If all citizens are lobby group members,
Proposition 3 becomes completely replicated ((
 =1 ).
18This result is referred to as the ‘general case’ in the Appendix.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 17
5 Summary and Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to derive pollution taxes in the context of
lobbying and transboundary pollution. In the speci c setup, pollution in one
country is assumed to a ect not only residents in that country but also residents
in another country. A standard lobby group model is used to characterize the
in uence from environmental and industrial lobbying on an incumbent govern-
ment. The framework is then extended to incorporate environmental policies
determined in a negotiation between the two countries a ected by pollution.
It is found that the assumption of local lobbying, implying that the domestic
government puts no weight on the preferences of the other country’s environ-
mentalists, tends to reduce the pollution tax. The intuition is that a government
has no incentive to satisfy the preferences of lobby group members in the other
country. Note, however, that it will still be a bargaining outcome where each
country considers the other country. Second, a general increase in the envi-
ronmental concern and in the weight the governments attach to social welfare,
respectively, tends to increase the pollution tax in a symmetric equilibrium.
The intuition for the  rst part is that more people experience disutility from
pollution, which increases the willingness to pay for reduced pollution levels and
hence increases the tax on pollution. The second part is explained by the fact
that when a government increases the relative weight attached to social welfare,
it increases the weight attached to environmentalists’ preferences in the other
country.
The model also shows that an increase in the number of environmentalists in
just one country may reduce the other country’s tax on pollution in a symmetric
equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is that a government tends to
accept a higher tax on pollution when the number of environmentalists in that
country increases, which implies that the other country tends to reduce its tax
on pollution.
Allowing for asymmetries between the two countries gives rise to interesting
consequences. For example, it is possible that a general increase in the environ-
mental concern reduces the taxes on pollution. The driving force behind this
result follows the same intuition as in the symmetric equilibrium when the num-
ber of environmentalists in just one country increases. That is, a government
becomes more eager to reach an agreement when the number of environmen-18 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
talists increases in that country, which leads to reduced pressure on the other
country to implement a high tax on pollution.
The main implication of this paper is that it is not always correct that an
increase in the environmental concern increases the pollution taxes. This is an
interesting  nding since it seems to correspond to results in Conconi (2003).
However, it is important to emphasize that the result in the present paper
arises strictly from the bargaining process and does not rest on the assumption
of trade between the two countries, i.e. it is not a terms of trade e ect as in
Conconi (2003). Hence, the point to be made here is that, although due to
completely di erent mechanisms than other studies, the present model gives
rise to the counterintuitive possibility that an increase in the environmental
concern increases the pollution taxes.
A possible extension of the present paper would be to change the setup
slightly and allow for transboundary pollution in a more ‘unrestricted’ way.
This is possible in our speci c framework, although it would require a consid-
erably more complicated analysis of the comparative statics. Another possible
extension is to moderate the bargaining process in a more sophisticated manner
(e.g. by endogenous participation). In addition, it would also be possible to
extend the model to include ‘cross-national’ lobbying as discussed in the intro-
duction. However as indicated, these extensions are left for future research.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 19
A Appendix
In the Appendix, subindices denote partial derivatives, e.g.  
# =  -




The general case The ‘general case’ refers to the model de ned in sections
2 and 3, i.e. the complete model without any simplifying assumptions. Section
4.4 follows from, and discusses, this ’general case’.
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, respectively. By substituting this
into equation (A.2), the following is obtained
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
A simultaneous system of the tax equations can be written as
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The determinant of the  rst matrix on the left can be written as |
| =
D ¡
2  + D¢





% .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t ,b yu s i n g
the  rst order condition for the maximization of the Nash product (see equation
(13)),   =   + 0. Moreover, the second order conditions for a maximum
imply that    # 0.
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implying that 44 -  + 0.
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  R 0 (A.9)
implying that 44 -  R 0.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 21
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Abstract
This paper analyzes environmental policy in a decentralized economic
federation comprising two countries, where a federal government decides
upon environmental targets (maximum allowable emissions) for each coun-
try, which are implemented by the national governments. Both national
governments have commitment power vis-à-vis the federal government,
whereas one of the national governments (the horizontal Stackelberg leader)
also has commitment power vis-à-vis the other country (the horizontal
follower). The results show how the horizontal and vertical commitment
power a ect the horizontal leader’s use of income and production taxes,
which are the tax instruments available at the national level.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many environmental problems are transboundary in the sense that the environ-
mental damage created by the production and/or consumption in one speci c
country does not only a ect the well-being of domestic residents; it also in-
 uences the well-being of residents in other countries. In this case, therefore,
environmental policies determined by individual countries without any coop-
eration are not likely to fully internalize externalities, as national policies are
typically governed by domestic objectives and constraints. There is a grow-
ing literature dealing with optimal tax policy in the presence of transboundary
environmental damage. However, this literature typically focuses on tax and
expenditure policies designed to implement non-cooperative and cooperative
resource allocations, or welfare e ects of policy coordination, without paying
much attention to the institutional structure within which the public policy
is decided upon.1 In a European context, much of the environmental policy
is determined within the European Union (EU), where the supranational level
typically decides upon maximum allowable emissions for the member countries
- referred to as ‘environmental targets’ in what follows - which are implemented
by the national governments. For instance, EU decides upon targets for green
house gases (via the so-called burden sharing agreement) as well as targets for
many other pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and lead, which the members im-
plement via taxation and/or other policies.2 Therefore, a  scal-federalism-like
approach may provide insights of relevance for understanding environmental
policy. The present paper considers an economic federation with transbound-
ary e ects of environmental damage across the member countries and focuses
on the incentives characterizing tax policy at the national level - described more
thoroughly below.
In the literature on optimal taxation in economic federations, EU is often
used to exemplify an economic federation with decentralized leadership - here
meant to imply that the national level of government acts as  rst mover (has
commitment power) vis-à-vis the federal government.3 This is so for at least
1See, e.g. Mäler (1989), Carraro (2003), van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) and Aronsson
and Blomquist (2003).
2See Council Directive 1999/30/EC for a complete report of limit values for concentrations
of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and nitrogen oxides, particulate matter and lead in the
ambient air.
3See e.g. Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan and Silva (1999) and Aronsson et al. (2006b).2 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
two reasons. First, the EU is still in a developing phase, meaning that mem-
ber countries may already have made commitments to policies based on their
national objectives. Second, the member state governments are represented in
the Council of Ministers, which suggests that individual member countries may
have a signi cant in uence over union policy.4
In addition, the member countries may also di er with respect to horizon-
tal commitment power, here meant to imply that a particular member country
might act as  rst mover in horizontal space vis-à-vis the others. For instance,
large countries such as Germany - most likely - has more potential to act strate-
gically against other countries than, say, Luxemburg or Sweden. The reason is
basically that such large countries have greater in uence on the economic de-
velopment within the federation than smaller countries. In the present paper,
this is interpreted so that one member country acts as a horizontal Stackel-
berg leader, whereas the other members act as horizontal followers. Stackelberg
leadership is often recognized in monopoly, or oligopoly, contexts, and modeled
so that the leader - who is assumed to have commitment power - moves  rst
and then the follower move sequentially. The reason for commitment power
typically refers to size (or market power), but possibly varies with the context
of interest.5
To my knowledge, there are no earlier studies dealing with environmen-
tal policy in an economic federation characterized by decentralized leadership,
where one of the member countries also exercises horizontal commitment power
vis-à-vis other members. Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to an-
alyze the incentives underlying optimal national tax policies in an economic
federation with decentralized leadership, where one of the countries acts as a
Stackelberg leader in horizontal space. Accordingly, although all member coun-
tries act as  rst movers vis-à-vis the federal government (vertical space), one of
them also acts as a  rst mover toward the others (horizontal space).
There are relatively few earlier studies dealing with environmental policy in
4In the EU, the Commission has the power to initiate environmental legislation. However
to become EU law, each proposal has to pass the Council of Ministers, which consists of
representatives from each member country, suggesting that the member state governments
have a strong position in the decision process.
5See e.g. Higgins (1996) for a brief discussion about which oligopolist would be the leader.
For empirical discussions of Stackelberg leadership across countries, see e.g. Altshuler and
Goodspeed (2002) and Ruiz and Gerard (2008).Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 3
economic federations with decentralized leadership. Silva and Caplan (1997),
and Caplan and Silva (1999) address environmental policy (emission taxes and
abatement policy) in an economic federation comprising a federal government
and two lower-level governments. In their framework, each level of govern-
ment controls one policy variable and, depending on which level makes credible
commitments, the economic federation is interpreted either as centralized or
decentralized. In Caplan and Silva (1999), one of the main  ndings refers to
the distribution of policy instruments between the levels of government. It is
shown - given model speci c assumptions - that it is socially desirable to give
regional governments the tax (price) instrument, while giving the central gov-
ernment a quantity instrument. This result applies for decentralized as well
as centralized economic federations and follows from the central government’s
ability of choosing the regional environmental damage levels as it wishes. As
a consequence, for a decentralized economic federation, the lower level govern-
ment has no better option than internalizing the transboundary environmental
damage it generates. Aronsson et al. (2006b) also consider an economic feder-
ation comprising two lower level governments - referred to as countries - and a
federal government. In their framework, the federal government decides upon
an emission target for each country (i.e. a maximum allowable emission), which
is implemented by tax policy at the national level. Each national government
faces a mixed tax problem, where the set of tax instruments contains a nonlinear
income tax and linear commodity taxes.6 In addition, it is assumed that the
national governments are  rst movers vis-à-vis the federal government, which
is meant to imply that the emission targets are conditioned on the national tax
policies. Their results show that the decentralized leadership creates incentives
for each country to in uence the emission targets decided upon by the federal
government. This implies that each country implements commodity taxes that
do not satisfy the so-called additivity property, and that the marginal labor
income tax is, in part, also used to relax the emission target.
The present paper follows Aronsson et al. (2006b) in the sense that the fed-
eral government decides upon emission targets, which are to be implemented by
the national governments. As mentioned above, the main contribution here is to
6Other studies dealing with mixed taxation in economies with environmental externalities
are e.g. Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson and Blomquist (2003). However, these
studies do not consider a federal decision structure with several levels of government.4 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
add the horizontal leader-follower dimension to their framework. To simplify the
analysis, the transboundary environmental damage constitutes the only direct
channel of interaction between the countries, meaning that other forms of direct
interactions - such as international trade and factor mobility - are disregarded.
In addition, to be able to focus on environmental policy, i.e. externality cor-
rection and the incentive to a ect the emmision targets, redistributive motives
for using distortionary taxation that may also apply in a competitive economy
(such as asymmetric information) are disregarded.7 For analytical convenience,
the federation comprises two countries; the country with horizontal commit-
ment power is de ned as the horizontal Stackelberg leader, whereas the other
is the horizontal follower. As indicated above, the access to horizontal commit-
ment power will create incentives for the horizontal Stackelberg leader to try
to in uence the other country and, thereby, a ect the emission targets. Given
the set of tax instruments - a production tax on an environmentally bad input
and a non-linear labor income tax - each national government is assumed to
maximize the domestic social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
the outcome of private, as well as federal government, optimization. Section
3 characterizes the behavior of the federal and the national governments. Fi-
nally, the optimal tax policy implemented by the horizontal Stackelberg leader
is presented in section 4, while the paper is concluded in section 5.
2 The model
Consider an economic federation comprising two countries, which di er with
respect to their ability of commitment. Country 1 - to be called the horizontal
Stackelberg leader - acts as  rst mover vis-à-vis both the federal government and
the other country. In contrast, country 2 - to be called the horizontal follower
- acts as  rst mover only vis-à-vis the federal government.8
The decision making structure within the federation is as follows. First,
the horizontal Stackelberg leader chooses its policy while anticipating, and in-
corporating into its decision problem, how the horizontal follower, the federal
7This approach is in line with Fuest and Huber (1997) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2004a,
2004b).
8The number of member countries has been normalized to two - additional horizontal
followers would not a ect the qualitative results.Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 5
government and the domestic private sector respond to its policy. Second, the
horizontal follower chooses its policy, taking as given the policies decided by
the horizontal Stackelberg leader, while anticipating the federal government’s
and the domestic private sectors’ response to its policy. Third, the federal
government chooses maximum allowable emissions (environmental targets) for
the countries. These targets are conditioned on the national tax policy, while
anticipating the behavioral responses by the private sector in each country. Fi-
nally, the private sector makes its choices conditional on the domestic public
policy. However, when solving for the optimal tax policy, it is convenient to
start backwards, i.e. with the private sector, the federal government and so on.
2.1 Consumers
Each member country is made up of identical consumers, the number of which
is normalized to one. The preferences of the consumer in country  ( =1 2)




  "() (1)
where  is the consumption of a good produced by a clean technology,  the
consumption of a good produced by a dirty technology and D leisure. Leisure
is de ned as D = 
   ,w h e r e
 is a  xed time endowment and  the
hours of work. The variable  is the environmental damage and is treated as
exogenous by the consumer. The function 9(·) is assumed to be increasing in
each argument and strictly concave, while "(·) is increasing and strictly convex
in the environmental damage.
The consumer’s budget constraint is given by
    ¡
¢
=  + @ (2)
where  is the gross wage rate and   ¡
¢
is the income tax paid to the
national government. The price of good  is denoted by @, while good  is a
numeraire good. Good  i sa s s u m e dt ob et r a d e do naw o r l dm a r k e t ,w h i c hi s
meant to imply that its price is treated as exogenous by the federal and national
governments as well as by the private agents.
The optimal tax problem will be de ned in terms of a conditional indirect
utility function and conditional demand functions. Therefore, it is convenient6 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
to solve each consumer’s optimization problem in two stages (following Chris-
tiansen (1984)). In the  rst stage,  and  are chosen conditional on D and
the budget constraint  = +@,w h e r e is the consumer’s net income. This
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In the second stage, the hours of work are chosen to maximize the conditional
indirect utility function subject to the budget constraint  =      ¡
¢
.
The  rst order condition is written
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is the marginal income
tax rate.
2.2 Production
Turning to the production part of the model, each country is made up of
two competitive production sectors which produce goods  and , respectively.
Within each sector, all  rms are identical and their number normalized to one.
In both sectors, labor and a sector speci c input are used in the production,
while the production of good  also requires the use of an environmentally
bad input, =.9 The use of bad input causes emissions that are transboundary.
Therefore, the aggregate environmental damage in each country, ,i sd e   n e d
as
 = =1 + =2! (5)





















   = (7)
9The sector speci c production factor - introduced to avoid  xed wages - will be suppressed
for notational convenience throughout the paper. It is implicitly assumed that the sector
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where  is the production tax on the ‘bad’ input, and where subindices indicate
production sectors.1011 The production functions, 

 (·) and 
 (·), are increas-
ing and strictly concave in their respective arguments, and characterized by
decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it is assumed that the supply of the bad
input is completely elastic, meaning that the price of the bad input is indepen-
dent of changes in the demand. Therefore, it will be convenient to normalize
the producer price of the bad input to zero. This assumption follows related
literature (see e.g. Aronsson et al. (2006a)) and implies that the unit cost of the
bad input in sector  equals the production tax. It is also assumed that labor
is immobile between countries but completely mobile between sectors, meaning
that the wage in each country will be the same in both sectors. The  rst order
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the equilibrium levels of , 
, 

 and = can be written as functions of  and
, i.e.
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 ¢
(14)
where the  xed consumer price, @, is suppressed for notational convenience12.
10Since there are no consumption taxes, the producer price equals the consumer price.
11See Cremer and Gahvari (2001) for a discussion about the choice between a consumption
tax and a production tax, and its implications for the results.
12The  xed consumer price, , will be suppressed in what follows.8 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
3 Public Policies
This section begins with a characterization of the federal government’s problem.
It then continues with the decision problem facing the horizontal follower, as
well as the decision problem facing the horizontal Stackelberg leader.
3.1 The federal government
The federal government maximizes the aggregate welfare of the federation by
choosing targets, ;, for the emissions arising from the use of the bad input
in the two member countries.13 To solve this problem, note that the federal
government recognizes the relationship between environmental damage and the
bad input, as de ned by equation (5). In addition, the federal government is
assumed to recognize the equilibrium function for the bad input, i.e. it behaves
as if each national government uses its production tax to control the bad input.
This ‘extra’ assumption is needed to introduce a trade-o  between environmen-
tal quality and production from the perspective of the federal government that
is consistent with the behavior of the private sector (see below). Besides, the
assumption that the production tax is used to control the use of bad input
is reasonable in the sense that it can be considered as the most direct policy
instrument available. Accordingly, when determining the emission targets, the
federal government uses  =  ¡
=¢
, which is the inverse of equation (14).
Notice also that from the federal government’s point of view, the production
tax is, in this respect, conditioned on the hours of work, .
When the federal government solves its decision problem, it recognizes that
the national governments’ budget constraints must be satis ed. The national
government taxes pro ts, labor and the bad input to  nance an exogenously
given revenue requirement, , meaning that the budget constraint facing the




 +   ¡
¢
+ = = ! (15)
By combining equation (15) with  =     ¡
¢
, and equations (6) and
(7), as well as with the identity    

 +
, each national government’s budget
13Note that, since the environmental damage is linear in the bad input,  equals the use
of bad input.Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 9
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The federal government then maximizes the sum of utilities over both coun-
tries and the optimal-target problem can, therefore, be written as
max











 = =1 + =2 (18)
 =  ¡
= ¢
! (19)
where  and 
 are given by equations (16) and (12), respectively, and where
it is assumed that the environmental targets are binding, meaning that = = ;.
By substituting equations (16), (18) and (19) into equation (17), the federal
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is the marginal willingness to pay
by the citizen in country  for a small reduction in . These  rst order con-
ditions imply that the value of the marginal product of the bad input should
equal the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for reduced environmental
damage, adjusted for di erences in the marginal utility of income between the
two countries. These adjustments arise because the federal government does
not have any policy instruments available for redistribution of income between
countries. That is, if the federal government were able to equalize the marginal
utility of income among countries, the right hand side of equations (20) and
(21) would reduce to , 

1 + , 

2 .
In order to explain how the quotient of marginal utilities of income in uences
the federal government’s optimal choices, consider the case when  22 +
 11, which is here interpreted to imply that the citizen in country 2 has10 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
a lower income than the citizen in country 1. By comparison with the case
of equally distributed income, the right hand side of equation (20) will now
increase, which suggests that the environmental target imposed on country 1
re ects a higher weight on country 2’s marginal willingness to pay for reduced
environmental damage. In other words, the use of bad input in country 1 must
be reduced, relative to the case with equally distributed incomes, so that the
value of the marginal product of the bad input compensates for the change on
the right hand side of equation (20). As for the target de ned by equation
(21), it has a completely analogous interpretation, meaning that country 2 is
allowed to use more of the bad input relative to the case with equally distributed
incomes. The implication of these results is that the environmental targets re-
 ect the federal government’s desire to equalize the marginal utilities of income
across countries - here achieved by tightening the environmental constraint for
the country with higher income, while loosening it for the country with lower
income. Moreover, equations (20) and (21) implicitly de ne the environmen-
tal targets as functions of 1 and 2, so that the federal government’s reaction
functions can be written as
; = ; ¡
1 2¢
  =1 2! (22)
3.2 The horizontal follower
The horizontal follower chooses a production tax and an income tax schedule
to maximize the conditional indirect utility function speci ed in equation (3),
subject to equations (5), (16) and (22). Besides, since country 2 is the horizontal
follower, the hours of work in the other country, 1, are treated exogenous.
Following previous studies, and since 2 (·) is a general labor income tax that
can be used to implement any desired combination of consumption and hours
of work, it has become common practice to use 2 and 2 as direct decision
variables instead of the parameters of the income tax function. The Lagrangean
corresponding to the government’s problem becomes
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are Lagrange multipliers associated with the foreign and domestic environmentalEnvironmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 11
target constraints, respectively. By using the  rst order condition for 2,a n d
since the wage rates are equalized between the production sectors, the  rst order
conditions for 2 and 2 can be written as










































  (2 =0 (25)
These  rst order conditions implicitly de ne 2 and 2 as functions of the horizon-
tal Stackelberg leader’s choice of hours of work, i.e. 2 = 2(1) and 2 = 2(1).
Assuming that the environmental target constraints are binding, equations
(24) and (25) show that 1 in uences 2 and 2 both via ; ¡
1 2¢
(via the
damage function ") and via the  rst derivative of ; (·) with respect to 2,i . e .























By solving for the 2 and 2 that do not appear in either ; (·) or ; (·)2 (i.e.




























Equations (28) and (29) are convenient for interpretational reasons in what
follows, and will be referred to as the horizontal follower’s implicit reaction
functions.12 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
3.3 The horizontal Stackelberg leader
The horizontal Stackelberg leader acts strategically vis-à-vis both the federal
government (vertical leadership) and the other member country (horizontal
leadership). The objective of the horizontal Stackelberg leader is to imple-
ment a policy mix that maximizes the conditional indirect utility function,  1,
in equation (3). The horizontal Stackelberg leader takes into account that the
use of the bad input in each country is determined by equation (22), here de-
 ned as  = ; ¡
12¢
. The horizontal Stackelberg leader also recognizes the
implicit reaction function for 2, equation (28). However, the horizontal Stack-
elberg leader does not need to consider that 1 and 1 in uence 2 as shown in
equation (29). The reason is that, although the horizontal Stackelberg leader
may in uence the production tax, 2, it only a ects =2 (·) which, in the end,
must be determined by the environmental target level. Therefore, a constraint
re ecting horizontal leadership via 2 would become redundant in this speci c
setup, meaning that the horizontal Stackelberg leader only needs to consider
the implicit reaction function for 2 (equation (28)).
The discussion above implies that the Lagrangean associated with the hori-
zontal Stackelberg leader’s decision problem can be written as
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where :1 = :
¡
1D1¢
. The Lagrange multipliers associated with each constraint,
respectively, are & , (1, (2, '1 and %. The last constraint is the implicit reaction
function of the follower, equation (28), for which it has been used that  =
; ¡
12¢
. Since the Lagrangean is de ned in terms of explicit constraints to
re ect the strategic leadership, 1, 2 and 2 are treated as additional decision
variables. It should be noted that this, perhaps unusual, way of de ning the
Lagrangean is for interpretational convenience, although it could have beenEnvironmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 13
written slightly more compact. The  rst order conditions become
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2 = ; ¡
1 2¢
2. Conditional on the implicit reaction function
of the follower, as de ned by the last constraint in the Lagrangean, it is obvious
t h a tt h ec h o i c eo f1 and 2 partly works via the mechanisms de ned by equation
(37). Equation (37) describes how the hours of work in country  in uences the
function C via the marginal target e ects of the followers use of 2, i.e. via
;2.
4T a x P o l i c y
This section characterizes the tax policy implemented by the horizontal Stack-
elberg leader, which is implicitly de ned by equations (31) - (36). To clarify the
incentive structure facing the horizontal Stackelberg leader, the analysis begins
with a benchmark case that disregards the federal government. The analysis
then continues with the decentralized economic federation as described above.14 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
4.1 Special case: No federal government
In the case of no federal level, each country is assumed to act as described earlier,
meaning that country 1 is the horizontal Stackelberg leader and country 2 the
horizontal follower. The horizontal follower’s  rst order conditions, equations





the horizontal follower’s Lagrangean are now redundant. In addition, without
the binding environmental target constraints, the horizontal Stackelberg leader
has to consider its in uence on =2 (·), since this is no longer determined by
the federal government’s constraint. In other words, the reaction functions for
both 2 and 2 must be considered in the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s decision
problem. Since the reaction functions of the horizontal follower are derived from




. This, in turn, implies that the horizontal follower’s reaction func-
tions now can be written as 2 = 2 ¡
=1¢
and 2 = 2 ¡
=1¢
. That is, the horizontal
Stackelberg leader’s use of the bad input has a direct e ect on the horizontal
follower via the environmental damage. The Lagrangean corresponding to this
problem for the horizontal Stackelberg leader is shown in the Appendix. The
horizontal Stackelberg leader’s optimal policy is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In the absence of a federal government, the horizontal Stackel-
berg leader’s optimal production tax is de ned as
1 = , 














whereas the optimal marginal income tax rate equals zero, i.e. 1 (·)=0 .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Let us begin by interpreting the policy rule for the production tax, 1.T h e
 rst term on the right hand side, which is standard, is the marginal willingness
to pay by the citizen in country 1 for a reduction in domestically generated
damage. However, since the citizen in country 1 is also a ected by the use of
the bad input in country 2, there is an incentive for the national government to
use its horizontal commitment power to change the behavior of the horizontal
follower. This is captured by the terms within the square bracket and works via
the reaction functions. Speci cally, according to equations (24) and (25), if (1Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 15
and (2 are set to zero, the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s use of the bad input
in uences the marginal environmental damage experienced by the horizontal
follower. This, in turn, a ects the follower’s optimal policy and therefore also
the use of the bad input. The production tax in Proposition 1 therefore not
only re ects the marginal willingness to pay for reduced environmental damage,
but also captures a desire to reduce the use of bad input in the other country.14
To explain why the marginal income tax rate is zero, observe that the hor-
izontal Stackelberg leader controls the other country’s choice of bad input via
the production tax. This implies that the horizontal Stackelberg leader does not
have to use the marginal income tax rate for externality correction (the mar-
ginal income tax does not improve the possibility to correct for the externality).
This result can be interpreted as an analog to the additivity property in Sandmo
(1975), which basically states that a correction should be made using the most
‘direct’ policy instrument available. In this case, the marginal income tax only
a ects the use of bad input indirectly via the hours of work, meaning that the
most direct instrument is the production tax. Accordingly, the production tax
works as a perfect instrument for externality correction, while the income tax
is used solely for revenue collection.
4.2 The decentralized economic federation
Let us now return to the federal structure in which each member country has to
comply with the environmental target levels chosen by the federal government.
In this case, the horizontal Stackelberg leader considers both the horizontal
leadership vis-à-vis the other country and the vertical leadership vis-à-vis the
federal government. In addition, the environmental targets imposed by the
federal government must also be ful lled. For analytical convenience, de ne
F =1 
¡
1   &
2
¢
and consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where
the horizontal commitment power di ers between countries, the production tax
imposed by the horizontal Stackelberg leader is given by

















14Observe that, in a noncooperative Nash equilibrium the production tax would equal the
marginal willingness to pay by the domestic consumer for reduced environmental damage, i.e.
the terms inside square brackets are zero and 1 = 
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This tax formula is derived by combining equations (32) - (34) and (36) with
equation (10). The  rst term on the right hand side is the marginal willingness
to pay for reduced environmental damage by the citizen in country 1. The
second term arises because country 1 has to comply with the environmental
target imposed by the federal government. Speci cally, with a binding target
constraint, the horizontal Stackelberg leader is forced to attach a higher value on
the environment than it would otherwise have done, provided that the welfare
is increasing in the domestic environmental target level, i.e. provided that
(1& + 0.
The third part of the tax formula is associated with the horizontal commit-
ment power. According to equations (20) and (21), each country’s environmen-
tal target is de ned so that the value of the marginal product of the bad input
in that country should re ect the marginal willingness to pay for reduced envi-
ronmental damage in both countries. Hence, the target levels are in uenced by
2 because this a ects the marginal product of the bad input, which, in turn,
a ects the environmental target levels.15 These horizontal mechanisms work
via the function C as de ned in the Lagrangean, equation (30).16
Let us now turn to the optimal marginal income tax rate.
Proposition 3 In an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where
the horizontal commitment power di ers between countries, the marginal income





















The tax formula in Proposition 3 is derived by combining the horizontal
Stackelberg leader’s  rst order conditions with equation (4). Since the marginal
income tax rate now di ers from zero (recall the zero marginal income tax rate
in Proposition 1), Proposition 3 suggests that the marginal income tax should
be used for externality correction. All terms on the right hand side of the tax
formula arise because the horizontal Stackelberg leader wants to in uence the
15According to the complete  rst order conditions for the environmental targets (equilibrium
conditions have been used in equations (20) and (21)), there are, however, additional e ects
arising from a change in the hours of work. This makes the total e ect on the use of the bad
input ambiguous.
16The implicit assumption behind these mechanisms is that the environmental target must
be equal to the use of the bad input, which is in uenced by the production tax rate.Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 17
environmental targets. The  rst two terms inside the square bracket show that
the horizontal Stackelberg leader uses the vertical leadership to control both
countries’ environmental targets. That is, the horizontal Stackelberg leader uses
that the domestic choice of hours of work has a direct e ect on the environmental
targets imposed by the federal government. The explanation for the e ect on the
domestic target is that the hours of work, 1, a ect the value of the marginal
product of the bad input which, in turn, changes the environmental target.
Recall that the environmental targets are determined by equations (20) and
(21).
The remaining terms in the tax formula re ect that the horizontal Stackel-
berg leader uses the horizontal commitment power to change the hours of work
chosen by the citizen in the other country, 2, via the function C (de ned by
equation (37)), which, in turn, a ects both countries’ target levels. That is, it
shows an ‘indirect’ e ect on the target levels via 2. These mechanisms arise
from the assumption of horizontal commitment power but, it is important to
recall that it is not a strictly horizontal mechanism. The reason is that the hor-
izontal Stackelberg leader in uences the target levels which, in turn, a ect the
hours of work in country 2. In the end, this will in uence both countries’ target
levels, meaning that the horizontal leadership works through the environmental
targets, i.e. indirectly via the vertical leadership.
Finally, notice that the mechanisms working via C are similar to the mecha-
nisms associated with the horizontal commitment power in the production tax
formula in Proposition 2. However, the di erence is that the marginal income
tax rate has a direct e ect on the hours of work, 1, which in uences the hori-
zontal follower’s choice of 2 via the function C.
4.2.1 Special case: The horizontal follower treats ;1 and ;2 as ex-
ogenous
So far, the horizontal follower has been assumed to act as a leader toward the
federal government. However, it is perhaps equally natural to assume that the
horizontal follower is a follower in all respects, i.e. treating the environmental
targets, ;1 and ;2, as exogenous. In such a setup, the Lagrangean associated18 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
with the problem facing the horizontal follower is written
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where a ’bar’ indicates that the variable is treated as exogenous. The  rst
order conditions corresponding to this problem are shown in the Appendix. By
comparison with equations (24) and (25), the solution to this problem implies
 rst order conditions for the horizontal follower that do not re ect any marginal
environmental damage - there are no e ects via the function ". Therefore, the
reaction functions facing the horizontal Stackelberg leader can now be de ned
as 2 = 2(2) and 2 = 2(2). By using these functions in the horizontal
Stackelberg leader’s problem, the following result can be derived.17
Corollary 1 If the horizontal follower acts as a Nash competitor also toward
the federal government, the optimal production tax formula for the horizontal
Stackelberg leader reduces to






Proof: See the Appendix.
Since the horizontal follower in this scenario acts as a Nash competitor to-
ward the federal level, the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s motive for using the
production tax to a ect the target function no longer exists. This implies that
the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s production tax equals the domestic mar-
ginal willingness to pay for reduced environmental damage, although adjusted
to account for the other country’s experienced disutility, which is re ected by
(1&. The interpretation in this case is, therefore, that the horizontal commit-
ment power does not give any e ective channels through which it is possible to
change the behavior of the other member country.
Turning to marginal income taxation when the horizontal follower acts as a
Nash competitor towards the federal government, the following result is derived.
Corollary 2 If the horizontal follower acts as a Nash competitor toward the
federal government, the optimal marginal income tax rate implemented by the
17The notation follows the previous cases where  = .Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 19












Proof: See the Appendix.
In the case where the horizontal follower acted as a leader toward the fed-
eral level (Proposition 3), the horizontal Stackelberg leader had the opportunity
to in uence 2 via the mechanisms de ned by the implicit reaction function.
However, without the horizontal follower’s vertical leadership, the horizontal
Stackelberg leader has no e ective channels (other than via the vertical lead-
ership) through which it may in uence country 2 since 2 only depends on 2.
This means that the marginal income tax rate now only re ects the horizontal
Stackelberg leader’s vertical leadership vis-à-vis the federal government. Still,
the leadership is used to in uence its own environmental target levels, as well
as the follower’s.
5 Summary and discussion
This paper analyzes environmental policies in a decentralized economic federa-
tion where the federal government decides upon national environmental targets
(maximum allowable emissions). Although the environmental targets are to
be implemented at the national level, it is assumed that the national govern-
ments are  rst movers vis-à-vis the federal government, which gives the economic
federation its decentralized structure. Furthermore, it is argued that member
countries within the economic federation di er with respect to their horizon-
tal commitment power, which has been interpreted to mean that one member
country, the horizontal Stackelberg leader, acts as  rst mover vis-à-vis the other
member country, the horizontal follower.
Given the framework, this paper focuses on the incentives underlying the
tax policy implemented by the horizontal Stackelberg leader. The results show
that, in addition to the more or less standard result that environmental taxation
should re ect marginal willingness to pay for reduced environmental damage,
the horizontal Stackelberg leader has an incentive to in uence the environmental
targets imposed by the federal government. These mechanisms are interpreted
as a desire to relax the domestic environmental target, while tightening the20 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
other member’s target constraint. This is re ected in both the production
tax and the marginal income tax rate. However, it is important to emphasize
that the incentives for in uencing the environmental targets not only apply
directly vis-à-vis the federal government, but also indirectly via the horizontal
commitment power vis-à-vis the other country. It is also important to point
out that these results presuppose that all member countries act as  rst movers
vis-à-vis the federal government. Without that assumption, there will be no
strategic incentives associated with the horizontal commitment power.
Furthermore, this paper has focused on the horizontal interactions arising
from transboundary environmental damage, meaning that other possible inter-
actions have been disregarded. Another possible source of horizontal interaction
related to the environmental damage is that the price of the good produced by
using the bad input is endogenous. An endogenous price would give rise to ba-
sically three additional mechanisms to consider for the horizontal Stackelberg
leader. First, if the horizontal Stackelberg leader is a net exporter, it would try
to improve its own welfare by increasing the market price. Second, since the
price level would in uence the environmental targets, mechanisms correspond-
ing to those discussed for the hours of work would arise via the target functions.
Third, and perhaps most relevant, price changes would have direct e ects on the
horizontal follower’s choice of input. For example, if the horizontal Stackelberg
leader has the ability to reduce the price of the good produced with bad input,
the lower price level ‘forces’ the horizontal follower to use less of the bad input,
which, in turn, improves the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s welfare.
As for future research, it would be interesting to model more complex hori-
zontal, as well as vertical, interactions to further clarify important mechanisms
that may arise in economic federations. It would also be interesting to intro-
duce negotiations in the political process regarding environmental policy at the
federal level. However as indicated, this is left for future research.Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 21
A Appendix
The Appendix will serve as a guide for deriving Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and
Corollary 2.
A.1 Proposition 1
In this case, the Lagrangean can be de ned as
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To derive Proposition (1), di erentiate this Lagrangean with respect to 1, 1, 1,
1, 2, 2 and 2. Thereafter, combine these  rst order conditions with the  rst
order condition for the use of bad input in the production sector, equation (10).
To derive the marginal income tax rate, combine the  rst order conditions for
1, 1 and 1 with the  rst order condition for 1 in the private sector, equation
(4).
A.2 Corollary 1 and 2
The  rst order conditions corresponding to the Lagrangean de ned by equation
(38) are
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With an analogous notation as in the previous setup, the horizontal Stackelberg
leader’s  rst order condition for 1, equation (34), reduces to  "   (1 +
'1 =0 . This implies that the combination of the horizontal Stackelberg leader’s22 Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and...
 rst order conditions for 1, 1 and 1 with the  rst order condition for the use
of bad input in the production sector, equation (10), give Corollary 1. To derive
Corollary 2, combine the  rst order conditions above with equation (4).Environmental Policy, Decentralized Leadership and... 23
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